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PRIVACY PRETEXTS
Rory Van Loo†
Data privacy’s ethos lies in protecting the individual
from institutions. Increasingly, however, institutions are
deploying privacy arguments in ways that harm individuals.
Tech companies like Amazon, Meta (Facebook), and Alphabet
(Google) wall off information from competitors in the name of
privacy. Financial institutions under investigation justify
withholding files from the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau by saying they must protect sensitive customer data.
In these and other ways, the private sector is exploiting
privacy to avoid competition and accountability. This Article
highlights the breadth of privacy pretexts and uncovers their
moral structure. Like most pretexts, there is an element of
truth to the claims. But left unchallenged, they will pave a
path contrary to privacy’s ethos by blocking individuals’ data
allies—the digital helpers, competitors, and regulators who
need access to personal data to advance people’s interests.
Addressing this move requires recognizing and overcoming
deep tensions in the field of privacy. The field’s normative
relationship with economics and third-party access has
become too strained. Although data privacy’s roots are in
guarding against access, its future depends on promoting
allied access.
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INTRODUCTION
Seeking to fend off competitive upstarts, Facebook blocked
fast-growing apps’ access to user data while publicly
explaining the move as necessary to safeguard users’ privacy.1
After thousands of customers fell victim to fraud, Western
Union fought a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) demand for
information by arguing that “privacy laws in 55 countries
would be implicated if it complied.”2 Sued for malpractice,
Kaiser Permanente—one of the nation’s largest healthcare
providers—resisted producing information about the plaintiff’s
own medical files by arguing that it was prohibited from doing
so under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA), the leading health privacy statute.3
In these and many similar instances, large institutions—
including Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, Capital One, and
Bank of America—turn privacy on its head. At its modern core,
information privacy is animated by holding institutions
accountable to individuals.4 Yet businesses are systematically
1 See
Read
the
Leaked
Facebook
Documents,
NBC
NEWS,
https://dataviz.nbcnews.com/projects/20191104-facebook-leaked-documents
[https://perma.cc/MN7E-Y2EF] [hereinafter Facebook Leaked Documents]; infra
Section II.A.
2 Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant the Western Union Company at 38,
F.T.C. v. W. Union Co., 579 Fed.Appx. 55 (2d Cir. 2014) (Nos. 13-3100, 13-3272).
3 Defendant Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Colo.’s Response in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Portions of the Audit Trail Withheld by Defendant
Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Colo. & Request for Sanctions at 3, Ortega v. Colo.
Permanente Grp., P.C., 265 P.3d 444 (Colo. 2011) (No. 2009-cv-9328) 2010 WL
8880811 (asserting that “HIPAA regulations expressly deny Plaintiff the right to
request an accounting of internal uses and disclosures” of the Plaintiff’s health
file).
4 This is true for both the federal government and private companies. See
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citing privacy to advance their interests at the expense of
individuals.5 Such behavior is problematic because it shows
how businesses can opportunistically use privacy to weaken
markets and the rule of law.
This Article shows the extent of this weaponization of
privacy against the information economy.6 I and others have
previously discussed the use of privacy as an excuse to
undermine competition to block third-party digital tools
seeking to help consumers shop,7 as a procedural move to
infra Section I.A. (summarizing privacy statutes).
5 Note that there may still be a privacy interest advanced. See infra Section
I.A. This differs from how businesses have exploited the weak privacy legal
regime, which involves circumventing privacy laws to extract data rather than
repurposing them to block data.
For valuable analyses of businesses
manipulating or disingenuously bypassing privacy laws, upon which this Article
builds, see, for example, JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 5–8, 56–58 (2019), which explains
that the problems with a weak privacy framework, in particular how the
notice-and-consent regime presents “opportunities for co-optation by corporate
claimants,” and Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97 WASH. U. L.
REV. 773, 834 (2020), which concludes that “paper trails, assessments and
audits, internal and external policies, to name just a few—take the place of actual
adherence to [privacy] law.”
6 For a more straightforward consideration of whether businesses can
legitimately assert their own privacy interests, see, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, A
Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 29 (2014), which notes that
“[S]cholars have all but overlooked whether a corporate constitutional right to
privacy exists. . . .”
7 See Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of
Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232, 242–43 (2018) (noting that businesses
misappropriate security laws to justify anticompetitive blocking of fintechs); Rory
Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 837–39 (2019) (urging
skepticism of privacy claims used to block digital intermediary acquisition of
information); Thomas E. Kadri, Digital Gatekeepers, 99 TEX. L. REV. 951 (2021)
(discussing how tech platforms misuse questionable privacy arguments).
Facebook also paid for an analysis of Apple’s emphasis on privacy in blocking
data for Facebook and others. See D. Daniel Sokol & Feng Zhu, Harming
Competition and Consumers Under the Guise of Protecting Privacy: An Analysis of
Apple’s
iOS
14
Policy
Updates
(June
14,
2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3852744 [https://perma.cc/8K4J-PPYW].
For
sustained treatments of antitrust and privacy from the perspective of seeing the
need to elevate genuine privacy concerns, see Erika M. Douglas, The New
Antitrust/Data Privacy Law Interface, 130 YALE L.J. F. 647, 654, 661 (2021)
(proposing greater weight be given to privacy matters in antitrust); Gregory Day
& Abbey Stemler, Infracompetitive Privacy, 105 IOWA L. REV. 61, 86 (2019).
Finally, scholars have long grappled with a broader point, that privacy sits in
tension with the free flow of information, and that privacy involves tradeoffs, most
notably with freedom of speech. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM
(1968) (observing that privacy faces challenges due to the embrace of the free flow
of information); NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 27–40 (2015) (summarizing the tension between privacy and
free speech); Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 837–
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block a criminal defendant from obtaining exculpatory
information,8 and as a “pretext” for deregulation.9 These prior
explorations of data privacy misuse are individually important
but their disconnect obscures the potential scope of the
problem.10 Widening the lens to link widespread instances of
businesses using privacy to block market and regulatory
information not only shows the breadth of the problem but also
helps to unpack privacy pretexts’ normative architecture,
revealing deep dysfunctions in the data governance
framework.11
To see privacy pretexts’ moral architecture, it helps to dig
deeper into the competing norms. Early conceptions of
information privacy emphasized an anti-intrusion impulse as
reflecting a desire “to be let alone” by not being watched or
having some information kept secret.12 Applied to data, this
and related conceptions of privacy focus attention on
safeguarding the individual from the threat of unwanted
access to information.13 It is this early, visceral anti-intrusion
notion of privacy that businesses channel when they deploy
privacy pretexts to advance their own interests
Yet people have a distinct set of interests in what a
business does with their data even if the business rightfully
has accessed it and never spreads it.14 For instance, people
39 (2019) (urging skepticism of privacy claims used to block digital intermediary
acquisition of information).
8 Rebecca Wexler, Privacy as Privilege: The Stored Communications Act and
Internet Evidence, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2721, 2722 (2021) (analyzing businesses’
use of privacy to withhold potentially exculpatory evidence from criminal
defendants); see also Kiel Brennan—Marquez, Beware of Giant Tech Companies
Bearing Jurisprudential Gifts, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 434 (2021) (casting Wexler’s
argument as a broader gambit).
9 See Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in
an Age of Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1563 (2019) (arguing that privacy
arguments are increasingly undermining regulatory monitoring of businesses).
10 Indeed, a broader information-limiting function of the law may be
observed, if privacy were combined with other areas of the law, such as
intellectual property. See infra note 233.
11 On data governance, see Salomé Viljoen, A Relational Theory of Data
Governance, 131 YALE L.J. 573, 586 (2021).
12 Daniel J. Paul M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, The New Privacy, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2163, 2164 (2003); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer
Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1419–
30 (2001).
13 See Solove, supra note 12, at 1419–1430.
14 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Monitoring, Datafication, and Consent:
Legal Approaches to Privacy in the Big Data Context, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND
THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 11 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014)
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may accept that Facebook collects data about them but not
want that data to be used to discriminate against them or to
manipulate their decisions. And they may not want their data
to be used to charge them monopoly prices. That other set of
interests people have in institutions responsibly managing
their data is referred to hereinafter as data management.15
The core move businesses make in privacy pretexts is to
use fundamentalist anti-intrusion norms as a smokescreen to
cover for a violation of data management norms. For example,
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) was intended to
keep hackers out of computers.16 In other words, the CFAA
protects against intrusions. Yet for years, platforms like
Facebook and Amazon have convinced judges that the CFAA
allows the platforms to sue third-parties that collect even
publicly available data.17 The businesses that Facebook,
Amazon, and other incumbents targeted included startups
that helped people save money on everything from auto rentals
to online shopping.18 Many of these startups rapidly failed or
became far less helpful to consumers because the CFAA
lawsuits deprived them of essential information, even though
consumers wanted them to have the information.19 Privacy
pretexts thereby enabled tech companies to twist an
(noting that the “development of digital computers . . . raised fears of misuse . . .
distinct from the concerns about emotional distress and reputation at the heart
of the privacy torts”).
15 This term is adopted for lack of an agreed upon term in the literature. I am
particularly grateful to Julie Cohen, Nita Farahany, Daniel Markovits, Arti Rai,
and Felix Wu for deep and often divergent help in refining this distinction.
16 18 U.S.C. § 1030; Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1652
(2021) (explaining how the CFAA followed a period in which “a series of highly
publicized hackings captured the public’s attention”). On the CFAA as a privacy
law, see, for example, Leslie R. Caldwell, Prosecuting Privacy Abuses by Corporate
and Government Insiders, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ARCHIVES (Mar. 16, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/prosecuting-privacy-abusescorporate-and-government-insiders [https://perma.cc/K9DQ-ZM49], which
describes the CFAA as “the law that protects the privacy and security of computer
owners and users.”
17 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1065–69
(9th Cir. 2016) (holding third-party platform liable under CFAA for accessing
Facebook users’ data “without authorization”).
Although scholars have
persuasively argued against this statute’s misinterpretation, those conversations
have not diagnosed the CFAA as part of a broader misappropriation of privacy
against markets. Orin Kerr is the leading voice on the CFAA’s misuse, albeit
focused on the statute’s criminal law angles. Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer
Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2016).
18 See infra Section II.A.
19 See Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, supra note 7, at 837–39
(summarizing incumbents’ strategic blocking of data).
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anti-intrusion statute into a statute that made consumers pay
higher prices or become more dependent on the largest
platforms.
This gambit works partly because anti-intrusion is far
more normatively salient. The impulse to resist intrusion has
a centuries-long head start in its development. The common
law protects against an invasion of privacy, and the Fourth
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches.20
Modern
scandals have further elevated anti-intrusion sentiments in
the public consciousness. Equifax, a credit reporting agency,
compromised about 150 million consumers’ social security
numbers, and Facebook gave Cambridge Analytica access to
the data of over seventy million unwitting users, which the
political consulting firm used to micro-target ads for the 2016
presidential election.21 In contrast, data management is newer
and guards against harms that are less instinctually
alarming.22 Thus, privacy pretexts pit a well-developed and
visceral normative foundation for anti-intrusion against a more
recent and subtle set of interests in data management.
Ironically, this move also pits the old privacy against the
new privacy. Privacy scholars have moved beyond the view of
privacy as guarding against intrusions to safeguard secrecy or
reputation.23 A vast and vibrant literature has also argued that
privacy serves to advance autonomy, fair information
practices,24 equality,25 civil society,26 deliberative democracy,27
20

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
McKenzie L. Kuhn, Note, 147 Million Social Security Numbers for Sale:
Developing Data Protection Legislation After Mass Cybersecurity Breaches, 104
IOWA L. REV. 417, 419 (2018).
22 See infra Part I (summarizing data management’s statutory development).
23 See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF 149–50
(2012) (“Privacy is not only about refusing access, visibility, or interference with
particular decisions. It is also more generally about preventing the seamless
imposition of patterns predetermined by others.”); Schwartz & Treanor, supra
note 12, at 2164 (distinguishing the old privacy from the new).
24 See, e.g., Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 12, at 2164 (“The new privacy is
centered around Fair Information Practices (“FIPs”). . . “).
25 See Radhika Rao, A Veil of Genetic Ignorance? Protecting Genetic Privacy to
Ensure Equality, 51 VILLANOVA L. REV. 827 (2006); Priscilla Regan, Legislating
Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy (1995).
26 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in
the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957 (1989).
27 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and
Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 557, 560 (1995)
(putting forth a conception of privacy as related to deliberative democracy and
deliberative autonomy, “which concerns the underlying capacity of individuals to
form and act on notions of the good when deciding how to live their lives”).
21
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liberal citizenship, and human flourishing, among other
goals.28 Scholars agree on neither how privacy is to be defined
nor whether it is even worth talking about the field’s
boundaries, and this Article adopts no definition.29 But
viewing privacy through these newer and expanded lenses
means that data management practices are also valuable for
advancing those goals.30 Additionally, many definitions of
privacy would include significant parts of data management,
at least in the sense that many view data protection as part of
data privacy.31 For those holding such a view, privacy pretexts
involve pitting one face of privacy against another.
Regardless of privacy’s boundaries, understanding the
normative architecture deployed by privacy pretexts is
important because it indicates the need for deeper renovations
to the information governance framework. Most importantly,
privacy has traditionally emphasized restrictions on
third-party access to prevent incidents such as the Equifax
breaches and the Cambridge Analytica scandal.32 But the
goals of data management cannot be advanced solely by
restricting access. Indeed, they depend on third-party access.
Modern markets are so complex that skillfully navigating them
requires consumers to have guidance from digital helpers,
such as price comparison engines and online financial
calculators.33 However, to make effective decisions, those
28 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is for, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1927
(2013) (“Privacy furthers fundamental public policy goals relating to liberal
democratic citizenship, innovation, and human flourishing, and those purposes
must be taken into account when making privacy policy.”).
29 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, GEO. L. J. 2087, 2087
(2001) (“Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and
contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings, that
I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all.”); Woodrow
Hartzog, What is Privacy? That’s the Wrong Question, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1677,
1688 (2021).
30 See infra Part IV. Privacy theorists have often argued against simplifying
privacy and making it one-dimensional. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 23, at 152
(“Human flourishing requires both boundedness and some ability to manage
boundedness.”)
31 Meg Leta Jones & Margot E. Kaminski, An American’s Guide to the GDPR,
98 DENV. L. REV. 93, 101 (2020) (“Data protection is more akin to what many in
the United States call “data privacy” or “information privacy”: protections that
attach to data sets (of personal data) that are stored and analyzed en masse.”).
This conceptual overlap will seem perplexing to some, and the resulting confusion
raises some interesting issues explored below. See infra Part I.
32 See infra Parts I, III.
33 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Pricing Misperceptions:
Explaining Pricing Structure in the Cell Phone Service Market, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
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digital tools require access to data about the individual.
Another category of crucial third-party access comes from
regulators. Many data management harms would be difficult,
if not impossible, for individuals to discover on their own, such
as whether banks are using information about an applicant’s
race or gender to set loan rates.
Access by regulators and digital helpers is thus essential
to data management. Yet privacy’s dominant normative
skepticism of third-party access allows businesses to use
pretexts to reframe beneficial third-party access as an
intrusion on the customer. To make that move less effective,
this Article proposes that privacy norms emphasize allied
access.
Allied access means systematically identifying
contexts in which the sharing of data with third parties might
increase
accountability,
competition,
and
user
sophistication.34
Harmonizing anti-intrusion and allied access requires
addressing another pathology that privacy pretexts exploit: the
subversion of economics. Privacy scholars have sought to
de-emphasize economic considerations.35
That stance is
understandable because economic arguments have long
provided fierce opposition to privacy regulation, based largely
on the costs of such regulation and the harms that would
result to innovation.36 Yet some of the most widely supported
justifications for data management lie in economics, in terms
of both efficiency and distributive justice.37
By paying
insufficient attention to these prongs of economic analysis,
privacy has left an opening for privacy pretexts to focus
attention away from data management’s economic harms
towards a visceral intrusion benefit, claimed by the business,
in cutting off data access to third parties.
These conceptual takeaways have important policy
implications. Lawmakers and regulators should write and
enforce legal rules with privacy pretexts in mind. Mindfulness
does not mean weakening important anti-intrusion legislation,
but rather remaining vigilant about preserving allied access
STUD. 430, 454–55 (2012) (showing how behavioral economics complicates
pricing).
34 This concept draws on diverse foundational conceptions in the literature,
and thus is arguably as much positive as it is prescriptive. See infra Part III.
35 See infra Section III.B.2.
36 Id.
37 These economic harms have been the object of attention by scholars
outside of privacy. See infra Section III.B.2.
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when writing rules. It also means considering how the
misappropriation of any given privacy law might undermine
data management interests, including efficiency. Additionally,
adopting that privacy misappropriation lens would help to
identify existing laws, such as the CFAA, whose reform would
advance allied access.38 Although not the focus of this Article,
doctrines outside of privacy, such as consumer law and
antitrust, could also benefit from recognizing pretexts and
could play a role in developing allied access.39
Now is a particularly important time to scrutinize privacy
pretexts because we are in the midst of a “constitutional
moment” for privacy,40 one of those rare times when “We the
People” engage with enough vigor to potentially push
large-scale legal change.41 If a once-in-a-generation federal
privacy statute is enacted, it may then be too late to start
looking at pretexts. It is hard to imagine follow-up legislation
just to address the problem of pretexts.42 Either way, privacy
law continues to develop at the state level and through federal
administrative agencies.43 Businesses have long shown great
skill at mobilizing laws ranging from free speech to trade
secrets as a form of Lochnerism to block regulation and wall
off public information.44 Strong privacy laws are crucial, but
38 Recent cases have taken steps in this direction. See, e.g., Van Buren v.
United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1662 (2021) (narrowing the scope of
“unauthorized access” under the CFAA).
39 Consumer protection laws prohibit some misleading statements by
businesses, and antitrust generally aims to block anticompetitive conduct. In
theory, some privacy pretext examples could be addressed by those doctrines.
Moreover, each of these areas engages in balancing tests that would be sharpened
by not falling for privacy pretext arguments. This Article focuses on other
solutions because such implications are at best a small part of the solution. See
infra Part IV.
40 Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the
Limits of Data Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2020).
41 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6–7 (1991)
(developing the concept of constitutional moment).
42 Among other reasons, firms will build around the privacy legislation. It
may then no longer be cost-effective to reengineer the system to allow regulatory
inspection without exposure to extensive personal data.
43 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State
Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 748 (2016); Daniel J. Solove &
Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 583, 599 (2014) (describing FTC privacy enforcement).
44 See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 13 (1996) (“Sometimes the
technologies, art forms, and commercial practices that succeed are those that fit
a particular set of legal metaphors.”); COHEN, supra note 5, at 5–8 (“Law for the
information economy is emerging . . . via the ordinary, uncoordinated but
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designing them without an eye towards ways that incumbent
businesses might manipulate them risks providing industry
with even more destructive weapons of information control.
Safeguards against pretexts should be integrated into the
blueprints while the privacy framework is still substantially
under construction.
Understanding privacy pretexts is thus valuable for the
challenging task of maximizing the returns that information
markets bring to society. Moreover, because addressing
privacy’s obfuscation of data management would yield
economic benefits, the improved normative architecture could
provide intellectual foundations for a stronger coalition in
support of omnibus privacy legislation.
Identifying the
widespread repurposing of privacy thus sheds light on a clearer
path toward seizing the current constitutional moment—and
doing so in a way that moors privacy law to its purpose of
protecting individuals rather than institutions.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the origins
of information privacy, paying particular attention to the
development of anti-intrusion and data management statutes.
Part II shows the breadth of businesses leveraging privacy
pretexts to block information from both private actors and
regulators. Part III uncovers the normative architecture of
privacy pretexts, showing how they benefit from the subversion
self-interested efforts of information-economy participants and the lawyers and
lobbyists they employ.”); Jonathan Wiener & Barak Richman, Mechanism Choice,
in PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 373–74 (Dan Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell
eds., 2010) (summarizing the literature on how industry may for its own interests
influence the regulatory process); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The
New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 464
(1998) (observing that “the economic vision embodied in Lochner is alive and well”
in intellectual property law); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 62 (1905) (striking
down laws limiting working hours as unreasonable restrictions on contract),
abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Amanda Shanor,
The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 206 (2016) (“The new Lochner’s
absolutist ‘speech is speech’ argument must be rejected . . . .”); Elizabeth
Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383,
392–93 (2017) (observing that “changing the legal environment is crucially
important,” an “increasingly salient” practice and “material part of the business
plan” for some companies); David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128
YALE L.J. 100, 140 (2018) (arguing that transparency has evolved from its roots
in progressive purposes to advance a deregulatory agenda); Amy Kapczynski, The
Public History of Trade Secrets, 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1367 (2022); Sonia K.
Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1183, 1279
(2019) (“[T]rade secrecy’s dominance over source code has been a significant
cause for concern in cases involving the public interest.”); Chris Morten,
Publicizing Corporate Secrets for Public Good, 171 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2022), www.ssrn.com/abstract=4041556 [https://perma.cc/2D2M-BNVL].
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of economics and ambivalence about third-party access. Part
IV sketches normative implications. The most promising
reforms lie not in punishing pretexts but in promoting data
management. In particular, a strong allied access principle
and greater attention to economic interests would lessen the
chances that conceptual blind spots enable privacy to serve as
an instrument for eroding markets and democracy.
Before turning to the main discussion, two brief notes are
in order about terminology. First, despite the focus on data,
the Article’s broader privacy pretexts framing is meant to signal
the scope and stakes of the problem. Scholars have previously
called attention to the use of privacy as a “pretext” not only in
narrower data contexts,45 but also in highly specific non-data
contexts. For instance, Susan Hazeldean and others have
argued that some use privacy as a “pretext” to fight the law’s
evolution regarding gender identity and sexual orientation.46 It
is worth exploring whether a related move is at play in these
non-data contexts of pitting the old privacy against the new.
Regardless, the stakes of privacy pretexts go beyond what
many people presumably imagine when they think about data.
Second, the word pretext has different implications. In its
most basic form, a privacy pretext occurs when the business
states that it is doing something for privacy purposes, but its
main motivation for that conduct really comes from something
else. Privacy pretexts may involve mixed motives.47 In many
cases, at least some constituents within the business might be
motivated to improve privacy, even if the main decisionmakers’
motives are something else. In other cases, the business may
not actually be motivated by privacy at all.
Because
determining corporate motive is notoriously difficult, the case
for a privacy pretext is usually circumstantial. But blurred
boundaries surrounding the definition of pretexts should not
45

See, e.g., Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State, supra note 9.
See, e.g., Susan Hazeldean, Privacy as Pretext, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1719,
1721 (2019) (“An asserted need to safeguard women’s privacy has become a
rallying cry for the opponents of laws forbidding discrimination based on gender
identity or sexual orientation.”); Ruth Colker, Public Restrooms: Flipping the
Default Rules, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 164 (2017) (“The privacy justification is
actually a pretext for the articulation of gender stereotypes about the
inappropriateness of men being exposed to women’s private, bodily functions.”).
I am grateful to Susan Hazeldean for her help in navigating the similar titles in
the same journal.
47 Mixed motives create a difficult challenge that the law handles
inconsistently. Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE
L.J. 1106, 1114 (2018).
46
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be allowed to get in the way of the more important observation.
Regardless of where on the pretextual spectrum any given
example may lie, the systematic inconsistencies and
opportunistic deployment of privacy arguments pose a problem
when the harms from the hidden interests advanced
substantially outweigh the highlighted privacy gains.
I
PRIVACY’S NORMATIVE IMBALANCE
This Part sketches the two faces of privacy pretexts:
anti-intrusion and data management.
Anti-intrusion
safeguards personal information from unwanted data access,
acquisition, or dissemination. We may not want Facebook to
know us too well, or we may not want our every move to be
tracked by Apple and Google through our phones. Once an
institution collects our data, we may not want them to sell it,
and most of us certainly would not want them to let hackers
steal it.48
Guarding against unwanted intrusions or
surveillance is an important component of privacy.
A second set of interests implicated by privacy pretexts can
be summarized as about data management.
Data
management is used here to refer to the diverse set of interests
that people have in their data beyond intrusions. It focuses on
how institutions use information once they have access. Its
more individual component would prevent the institution from
using data in a way that harms the subject of the data, such
as when prices are discriminatorily inflated on the basis of
race, gender, or other identified characteristics. Another
example of a harm is the use of data to manipulate the data
subjects’ decisions, such as in purchasing or voting.49
Data management also captures a more collective goal of
maximizing the societal gains from personal data. Efficiency
is one such collective interest; the data collected should be
48 Scholars and practitioners have approached the question of whether to
include data security within privacy in different ways. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove,
Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1880, 1880 (2013) (treating privacy issues and data breaches as
interchangeable); Lauren Henry, Information Privacy and Data Security, 2015
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 107, 107 (2015) (“Data security has separate objectives
from information privacy that can be agnostic or even in opposition to information
privacy.”).
49 See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
995, 1027–29 (2014) (identifying various economic harms, such as manipulation
and rent extraction, using people’s data); SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 1393–98
(encouraging a more database-oriented approach to privacy).
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managed in a manner that encourages competitive prices and
more attractive choices.50 Similarly, we may have an interest
in our social media data not being used to manipulate other
people’s votes and thereby undermine democracy—even if our
own vote is not being manipulated. Those more collective goals
are akin to natural resources management, which requires
balancing mineral extraction with tourist access—except here
the resource being managed is data.51 Data management has
significant overlap with but is broader than data protection,
which tends to have a more individual focus.
This Article takes no stance on the proper boundaries of
privacy, and whether data management on should be classified
as inside or outside of privacy. Nor does this discussion of
anti-intrusion and data management capture the full spectrum
of privacy’s articulated goals, such as those related to dignity,
citizenship, and power, or how to achieve them. Privacy has a
“bewildering variety of meanings.”52 As privacy scholars have
long recognized, attempts at defining privacy risk ending up
distracting readers and thus getting in the way of progress.53
This anti-intrusion versus data management taxonomy is
offered to illuminate some of the main norms involved in
privacy pretexts, not of privacy.54
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that many scholars and laws
classify significant parts of data management interests as
privacy.55 That classification is particularly prominent in the
50 Note that the interests in anti-discrimination and anti-manipulation can
be viewed from a collective perspective, in the sense of wanting to promote societal
equality or prevent meddling in elections.
51 See Dennis D. For conceptions of privacy that exploring analogies to
natural resources, see Dennis D. Hirsch & Jonathan H. King, Big Data
Sustainability: An Environmental Management Systems Analogy, 72 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. ONLINE 406, 407 (2016); COHEN, supra note 5, at 48–49.
52 RICHARDS, supra note 7, at 8.
53 See, e.g., HELEN FAY NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY,
POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 7–12 (2010) (pointing out that focusing
on the definitional debates gets in the way of progress); Hartzog, supra note 29,
at 1688 (emphasizing the importance of “shifting our focus away from questions
about what privacy is and toward the different problems we want our
privacy-based rules to address and the specific values we want them to serve.”);
but see Jeffrey Bellin, Pure Privacy, 116 NW. U. L. REV. 463, 471 (2021) (proposing
a baseline definition of the terms “right to privacy” and “privacy” to anchor legal
privacy discourse).
54 See, e.g., NISSENBAUM, supra note 53, at 7–12 (declining to adopt any
particular definition of privacy).
55 For examples of scholars who have this broader view of privacy, see
Hartzog & Richards, supra note 40, at 1721 (proposing a comprehensive
approach to privacy that includes data protection but also includes data
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U.S., where data privacy often includes data protection.56 In
this and other ways, privacy pretexts involve repurposing an
older and more fundamentalist conception of privacy against
newer conceptions of data privacy.
Where one comes out on how to classify data management
is of no consequence for this Article’s core thesis that
businesses are systematically weaponizing fundamentalist
anti-intrusion norms in ways that undermine an important
newer set of economic and social interests related to data.
Regardless of privacy’s boundaries, understanding privacy
pretexts’ normative dimension reveals important dysfunctions
in the information governance framework.
A. The Norms of Data Privacy Law
An overview of privacy’s historical development helps
elucidate how businesses use anti-intrusion to weaken data
management. Prominent early scholarship on privacy warned
of unwelcome technological intrusions. In 1890, when Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote The Right to Privacy—to
some, “the most influential law review article of all time”57—
they were motivated by “inventions and business methods.”58
They situated privacy within an expansive “right to be let
alone,” finding doctrinal support in a common law collection of
torts guarding against an “intrusion upon the domestic
circle.”59 They warned that “instantaneous photographs and
externalities, such as the negative effects on democracy); Daniel J. Solove, A
Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 489–491 (2006) (laying out sixteen
elements of privacy, including aggregation, identification, secondary use,
exclusion, increased accessibility, appropriation, distortion, and decisional
interference). The American Law Institute’s leading publication on the topic,
whose reporters were Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove, also puts data
management as part of privacy. See PRINCIPLES OF THE L.: DATA PRIVACY § 1 (AM.
L. INST. 2019). For an example of lawmakers viewing data management as part of
privacy, see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (2018) (including in the California
Consumer Privacy Act a data portability requirement). As another indication of
the common inclusion of data management in privacy, the field’s leading
gathering brings data management scholarship clearly into its fold, albeit with a
self-described “broad” definition of privacy. See PLSC History, Privacy Law
Scholars
Conference,
https://privacyscholars.org/plsc-history
[https://perma.cc/8PSB-56NA]. For a broader treatment of data management,
and examples of privacy scholars seeing this as within their field, see infra Part I.
56 See Jones & Kaminski, supra note 31, at 101.
57 See CHARLES O. GREGORY & HENRY KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
883 (Little Brown and Company 1959).
58 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 193 (1980).
59 Id. at 195–96.
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newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of
private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices
threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered
in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”60
Seventy years later, The Right to Privacy influenced the first
publication to galvanize the public’s attention on technological
threats to privacy. In 1964, Vance Packard’s best-selling book,
The Naked Society,61 sparked an eruption in worry about data
privacy.62 It warned that concealed cameras, filing systems,
and other new technologies “tend to annihilate the privacy and
dignity of citizens under scrutiny.”63 Explicitly adopting the
Warren and Brandeis definition of privacy as “the right to be
let alone,” Packard criticized a broad array of business and
government practices, ranging from credit report firms to
government wiretapping.64
Whereas The Right to Privacy had not mentioned the U.S.
Constitution or framed itself in norms of government
oppression, The Naked Society evoked George Orwell’s
dystopian 1984 world and criticized the Supreme Court for not
enacting more robust constitutional protections.65 The book
thereby tied privacy to a set of anti-intrusion norms—most
directly, from the Fourth Amendment—that resonated even
more deeply with the public than had the common law.66
Packard’s popular writings are credited with prompting
Congress to convene a Special Subcommittee on the Invasion
of Privacy, and with inspiring privacy advocates who would
shape legislation in the ensuing decade.67
Despite that strong anti-intrusion core to privacy, in the
background a set of data management interests emerged.
Most importantly, in 1973, the Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare responded to public concerns

60

Id. at 195.
VANCE PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY 34 (1964).
62 See MARGARET O’MARA, THE CODE: SILICON VALLEY AND THE REMAKING OF
AMERICA (2019); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 151 (2004).
63 PACKARD, supra note 61, at 34.
64 Id. at 34, 223.
65 See id. at 21–24.
66 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
67 Margaret O’Mara, The End of Privacy Began in the 1960s, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/05/opinion/google-facebookprivacy.html?smid=url-share [https://perma.cc/6LKS-UJH6].
61
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by ordering a study of the risks of record-keeping practices.68
The report outlined a set of fair information practices that would
become the cornerstone of the new privacy and “the closest
thing the world has to a universal privacy touchstone.”69 Two
of the principles reflect data management.70 The first urges
mechanisms “for an individual to prevent information about
him obtained for one purpose from being used . . . for other
purposes without his consent.”71 The other principle would
allow “an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable
information.”72 These two principles empower individuals to
manage personal data collected about them. They go well
beyond prohibiting the collection or sharing of information—
well beyond intrusions. Thus, as a cornerstone of privacy, the
fair information practices embody many observers’ views of
privacy as having a larger legal role in promoting data
management interests.73
Anti-intrusion and data management are embedded in the
first federal law to regulate business use of personal
information, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970.74
That Act targeted one of the industries subject to the most
scathing coverage in The Naked Society: credit bureaus.
Congress strove to meet “the needs of commerce for consumer
credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a
manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with
regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper
utilization of such information.”75 To prevent intrusions, the
FCRA restricted access to credit reports, except for actors with
a “permissible purpose,” such as landlords, lenders, and

68 U.S. DEP’T HEW, SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA
SYSTEMS, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS iii–vii (1973).
69 Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices,
76 MD. L. REV. 952, 954 (2017).
70 Some of those principles reflect anti-intrusion.
Most directly,
organizations should not disclose collected information to third parties without
legal authorization or consent of the individual. U.S. DEP’T HEW, supra note 68,
at 41.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 27 and accompanying text (providing
examples of this view).
74 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Other earlier acts constrained private actors in
different ways, such as The Wiretap Act of 1968. 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22
(constraining
nonconsensual
interception
of
electronic
and
other
communications).
75 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
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insurers.76 On the data management side, the FCRA provided
consumers with the right to have copies of their files and to
dispute inaccuracies.77 A related combination of first-person
access
rights
and
third-party
transfer
restrictions
characterizes two statutes enacted in 1974: the Privacy Act,
which applied only to federal agency information about
individuals,78 and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act.79
Following this wave of privacy legislation, Congress largely
ignored the topic for a decade. When lawmakers returned to
the subject, they took a strong turn toward anti-intrusion. In
1986, after President Ronald Reagan became concerned about
hackers,80 lawmakers enacted the CFAA to provide for criminal
prosecution of anyone who used computers with
“unauthorized access.”81 The Act would later become one of
the most powerful privacy pretext statutes.82
Several other statutes in the 1980s and 1990s emphasized
anti-intrusion, targeting everything from unwanted telephone
calls83 to disclosure of video rental history.84 This emphasis
reflected the growing realization that networked computers
made people susceptible to intrusions.85
The most notable exception to those anti-intrusion
statutes was HIPAA, passed in 1996.86 Lawmakers’ primary
goal was to promote third-party access to private medical
records by facilitating the “efficient” electronic exchange of
health care information among hospitals, insurers, and other

76 Id. The FCRA also gives users control over whether any access is possible
by requiring credit bureaus to allow consumers to freeze their credit reports. 15
U.S.C. § 1681c-1(i).
77 15 U.S.C. § 1681g.
78 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
79 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
80 Fred Kaplan, Cybersecurity’s Debt to a Hollywood Hack, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
19, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/movies/wargames-andcybersecuritys-debt-to-a-hollywood-hack.html [https://perma.cc/43G8-HQ87].
81 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
82 See infra Section II.A.
83 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227.
84 Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710; see also Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
85 See Kaplan, supra note 80.
86 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, Sec. 261 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d
note).
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medical industry actors.87 To do so, HIPPA imposed common
database standards and required medical actors to transfer
records to other actors.88 That data portability was intended
to empower individual patients with greater choice of providers
and a better chance at life-saving care, while also in theory
saving the medical system billions of dollars.89
Instead, HIPAA is a case study in how anti-intrusion
norms can swallow data management norms. Although the
primary goal of HIPAA was improving data management,
Congress recognized that the increased transfer and
centralization of information raised the risk of harmful
disclosures and misuse. For that reason, the statute required
the Department of Health and Human Services to issue rules
promoting privacy and protection of health data.90 Those rules
later provided patients with the right to notice, security, and
consent for many third-party disclosures.91 The agency framed
those rules in the context of the Fourth Amendment, the
Declaration of Independence, and fundamental rights.92
In the ensuing years, health providers routinely cited
HIPAA in resisting sharing medical information with other
health providers.93
Consequently, in both impact and
perception, anti-intrusion has become the face of what started
as one of the most important data management statutes. That
migration has become a blueprint for privacy pretexts in the
information age.94
The judicial approach to privacy demonstrates an even
greater focus on anti-intrusion than do statutes. In 1976, the
Supreme Court extended substantive due process protections
to information. In Whalen v. Roe, the Court declared that the
87

See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d.
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2.
89 See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Finding a Cure: The Case for
Regulation and Oversight of Electronic Health Record Systems, 22 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 103, 113, 116 (2008).
90 See HIPAA, Section 1128C(a)(3)(ii), 45 C.F.R. § 164.524.
91 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2020) (detailing such patient protections).
The rules also provided patients with the right to inspect their files to ensure
accuracy, which is more of a data management impulse. Id.
92 27 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,463–64 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160,
164 (2014)).
93 See Jessica Jardine Wilkes, The Creation of HIPAA Culture: Prioritizing
Privacy Paranoia Over Patient Care, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1213, 1241 (2014); Carleen
M. Zubrzycki, Privacy from Doctors, 39 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 526, 533 (2021).
94 See infra Section III.A.
88
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Constitution established a “zone of privacy” that protected “the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters.”95 In its conceptualization of privacy, the Court did
not include the data management principles beginning to
emerge at the time. Subsequent judicial opinions have
routinely linked privacy to the anti-intrusion image of an
overbearing Orwellian government spying on us.96
Over the past two decades, there have been some signs of
the potential for data management to emerge from the shadows
of anti-intrusion. Speaking about privacy in Congress in 2006,
Representative Ted Strickland declared that the “patient does
not
want
to
be
‘left
alone’
in
the
treatment
relationship . . . . Today, good health care requires that the
professional’s findings be entered into a permanent health care
record that is available to multiple other parties.”97 New legal
rules under the Obama and Trump administrations
accordingly pushed the access side of medical records
forward.98
The ubiquity and importance of networked digital
technologies has further helped elevate data management in
the 2010s. The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 required financial
institutions to share consumers’ data upon request in
electronic format, subject to Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) rulemaking.99 The General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) in 2016 and the California Consumer
Privacy Act of 2020 empowered consumers both to access
information that companies maintain on them and to share it
with third parties.100
95 429 U.S. 589, 598–99 (1977) (finding that there had not been an
unconstitutional intrusion of privacy).
96 See Margaret Hu, Orwell’s 1984 and Fourth Amendment Cybersurveillance
Nonintrusion Test, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1819, 1832–33, 1873 (2017) (surveying
judicial references to Orwell’s 1984 and analogies to “big brother”).
97 152 Cong. Rec. E 719 (May 3, 2006) (statement of Hon. Ted Strickland of
Ohio). Some courts have, however, taken a broader approach to applying
Whalen’s interest in decision-making independence. See Schwartz, supra note
27, at 581–82.
98 45 C.F.R. §§ 171.100–303 (2020). This rule was authorized under the 21st
Century Cures Act. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033
(2016) (codified as amended in scatter sections of 42 U.S.C.).
99 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1033(a),
12 U.S.C. § 5533(a).
100 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
Apr. 27, 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 15, 20, 2016 O.J.
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Despite these recent advances for data management,
courts and federal lawmakers have continued to focus their
privacy attention mostly on anti-intrusion.101 In 2021, the
Supreme Court evinced a heightened degree of hostility to data
management legislation. In TransUnion v. Ramirez, class
action plaintiffs brought suit under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act of 1970 against TransUnion102 for labeling the plaintiffs as
potential terrorists after scanning the Do-Not-Fly list and
finding that their names matched.103 The company took no
other action to verify that the two people were the same.104 The
plaintiffs argued that the credit reporting agency had not
followed reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of its
files as required under the FCRA.105 The FCRA granted
individuals a right to view all information in their file, and
provided them with a private right of action to enforce that
right.106
The Court essentially invalidated that data management
right of action.107 It held that most of the class action members
lacked standing because there was no concrete harm:
TransUnion had not yet provided their credit reports to third
parties.108 TransUnion had not shared that information in an
unwanted way. It merely inaccurately labeled those plaintiffs
in its internal files.109 The FCRA’s philosophy that individuals
have a right to manage data about them before that data is
accessed by a third party seemed to be a foreign concept to the
Court. Rather than embracing data management norms, the
Court hewed closer to the common law notion of an intrusion,
in this case the unwanted transfer of information, before
holding the credit reporting agency accountable.110
(L 119) 38 (EU); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2018).
101 See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Body Cameras and the Path to Redeem Privacy
Law, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1257, 1270 (2018) (“Courts and lawmakers keep defining
privacy in narrow ways, such as secrecy, ignoring privacy in social contexts and
new potential misuses of privacy information.”).
102 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2190 (2021).
103 Id. at 2201.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 2208.
106 Id. at 2200–01.
107 Id. at 2209–13.
108 Id. at 2212.
109 Id. at 2210.
110 Id. (“The mere presence of an inaccuracy in an internal credit file, if it is
not disclosed to a third party, causes no concrete harm.”). For a more extended
discussion of some of these issues prior to TransUnion, see Danielle Keats Citron
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B. Unifying Themes
This legal background is helpful context for analyzing
privacy pretexts. As Julie Cohen and James Boyle have
emphasized, in analyzing the information economy it is a
mistake to ask only how the law should change in response.
We must also recognize how the private sector mobilizes the
law.111 Yet seeing how that mobilization unfolds requires
paying “more attention to the legal forms in which information
issues are framed, debated, and resolved.”112 The above sketch
of information privacy’s origins demonstrates three themes
about privacy legal forms that will run throughout the rest of
the Article: salience, economics, and access.
First, there is a salience asymmetry between anti-intrusion
and data management. When legislation began with data
management goals—most notably, with credit reporting and
health care—Congress rightly felt compelled to also address
anti-intrusion issues.113
Conversely, when intrusions
motivated legislation, as with the CFAA, Congress did not
consider the corresponding data management implications.
This contrast helps demonstrate the supremacy of
anti-intrusion norms over data management norms. Intrusion
has much older lineage. Its deep roots can be seen in the
common law and the Constitution. By the time today’s largest
platforms emerged—and by the time personal data became big
business in many other industries, such as consumer
finance—the anti-intrusion principle dominated statutory and
judicial conceptions of privacy.
Second, from a policy perspective, data management has
a much stronger normative grounding in economics than does
anti-intrusion. Whereas individual rights tend to justify
anti-intrusion laws, economic theory provides one of the
strongest rationales for data management laws, such as
HIPAA.114 To be clear, data management can also be justified
from a rights perspective—the right to be free of inaccuracies
or to access data about oneself, for instance. However, data
accuracy and access are also essential for functioning markets.
In practice, data management restrictions on businesses are
& Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Harms, 102 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2022);
Cohen, supra note 5, at 150–51.
111 See Boyle, supra note 44, at 12; Cohen, supra note 44.
112 Boyle, supra note 44, at 12.
113 Cf. Hartzog & Richards, supra note 40, at 1704.
114 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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heavily influenced by economic concerns, such as making
financial markets function more effectively through better
credit data or lower health care costs. When anti-intrusion
restrictions are imposed on business activity, they are more
likely to be seen as in tension with economic interests.
Finally, the notion of access has shifted and expanded as
privacy has developed. Anti-intrusion is mostly oriented
around limiting access to information. However, as the field
evolved to incorporate data management principles, laws such
as HIPAA showed how at least some mandated third-party
access is important for comprehensive privacy legislation.
These themes do not mean that anti-intrusion is inevitably
in opposition to data management.115 Instead, these tensions
surrounding salience, economics, and access are noteworthy
because
they
create
openings
for
businesses
to
opportunistically deploy privacy in harmful ways.
II
REPURPOSING PRIVACY
Businesses use privacy pretexts in two main contexts.
First, they cite privacy to withhold information from private
actors, both competitors and digital helpers. Second, they
limit regulatory information sought by administrative agencies
and other actors, such as academic researchers and
journalists, who might use information to promote
accountability. This Part surveys efforts in each of these areas.
Later sections will elaborate on why this third-party access to
market and regulatory information is important to markets
and society.116
A. Blocking Market Information
Many large companies have cited privacy as a reason not
to share data with private entities. These companies include
large tech platforms such as Meta (Facebook), Alphabet
(Google), and Apple, as well as large banks such as Bank of
America and Capital One. In each of these instances, the lack
of data has the potential to weaken markets, whether by
cutting off data from competitors or digital helpers.

115 The degree of harmony varies by context, but they are overall compatible.
See infra Part IV.
116 See infra Section III.B.
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1. Keeping Information from Competitors
Facebook provides an informative case study of cutting off
information from competitors. Thousands of pages of leaked
emails and other internal documents illuminate Facebook
executives’ motives.117
The social network’s leadership
systematically monitored which apps were both (1) growing in
popularity and (2) offering competing services. Facebook then
restricted such apps’ access to data.118 These apps include
LinkedIn, a competing social network; Pinterest, which
competes with Facebook-owned Instagram; and MessageMe,
which offers messaging services like Facebook’s WhatsApp.119
The leaked emails also expose how Facebook sought to
frame anticompetitive acts as helping to protect users’
privacy.120 One vice-president explained that “the messaging
to the ecosystem becomes that we are deprecating a few things
for privacy reasons.”121 Another internal slide deck described
the removal of third-party access to data about users’ friends
as a “[b]ig potential privacy win” while acknowledging that the
real impact was “mostly moot” because favored partners could
get that same access through Facebook in other ways.122 These
justifications reflect the anti-intrusion face of privacy because
they are rooted in limiting third-party access to Facebook’s
data.
Despite Facebook’s external privacy justifications, the
emails show that the company was selectively targeting access
restrictions at the fastest-growing rival apps it viewed as
posing a “competitive threat.”123 Moreover, around the time
that Facebook restricted data access to competitors, it
expanded data access to heavy advertisers that were not
competitors, like Amazon and Netflix.124 Facebook’s emails
117

See Facebook Leaked Documents, supra note 1.
See Facebook Leaked Documents, supra note 1, at 1029.
119 See id. In some cases, the only way that the apps could retain access to
the Facebook platform was to share with Facebook all of their social data—their
most valuable assets. Complaint at ¶ 12, Reveal Chat Holdco LLC, v. Facebook,
Inc., 471 F. Supp. 3d 981 (N.D. Cal. 2020), 2020 WL 256483.
120 See, e.g., Facebook Leaked Documents, supra note 1, at 462–63 (explaining
how Facebook would say policies were “for privacy reasons . . . while not
necessarily being the most privacy sensitive.”).
121 See id. at 740.
122 See id. at 777.
123 See id. at 1029, 1033 (targeting also those “present[ing] a significant
overlap with our [] roadmap”).
124 Id. at 359, 575, 1311. Note that in areas where Facebook viewed Amazon
as a competitor, the social network limited access. See id. at 360.
118
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and internal documents therefore indicate that privacy
concerns were a facade to cover Facebook’s real motivations
for cutting off data: to hobble potential competitors.
Apple offers a contrast to the example of Facebook, both in
the difficulty in characterizing the pretext and the nature of the
restriction. Unlike Facebook’s targeted restrictions, Apple
created access barriers to all third-party apps. It cited
customers’ privacy interests in not having third-party apps
track them and collect excess data.125 For instance, the app
developer Tile helps people locate their lost items.126 Following
the changes, Apple made the Tile app obtain user permission
for “tracking” before turning location data on.127 Without
location data, the app cannot offer its core services.
That change sounds reasonable, and like Facebook’s
moves it may overall advance at least some privacy interests.
Apple’s motives become murkier, however, when considering
that Apple did not provide similar tracking and data collection
protections with respect to its own apps. For instance, Apple’s
app Find My, like Tile, helps people to locate items. Yet Find
My, unlike Tile, defaulted to location tracking “on” even after
Apple announced its universal new “protections” against
tracking.128
That subtle difference matters enormously
because consumers overwhelmingly tend to stick with
defaults; 94% of Apple customers stayed with the default of
declining data collection when prompted to choose.129 Without
a trove of leaked internal documents, it is more difficult to
assess Apple’s motivations. Nonetheless, the fact that Apple
did not believe an extra layer of warning was necessary for
consumers using its own comparable device tracking app, and
the fact that the move helps Apple to limit apps competing with
125 Apple, Privacy: App Tracking Transparency, YOUTUBE, at 00:30 (Apr. 26,
2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ihw_Al4RNno
[https://perma.cc/XV77-SJH2] (“[S]ome apps have trackers embedded in them
that are taking more data than they need.”).
126 Privacy
Policy,
TILE,
https://www.thetileapp.com/privacy
[https://perma.cc/H9TJ-CHU2] (last visited, Dec. 12, 2021).
127 See id.
128 H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COMMERCIAL, AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 116TH CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL
MARKETS: MAJORITY STAFF REP. AND RECOMMENDATIONS 55 (2020),
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3QRL-2N4D].
129 See Greg Bensinger, Americans Actually Want Privacy. Shocking., N.Y.
TIMES (May 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/20/opinion/applefacebook-ios-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/VC87-EB7C].
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its own, suggest that the company was using privacy as an
anticompetitive pretext.130
Privacy pretexts are not limited to the app ecosystem.
Amazon engages in similar rhetoric with third-party
manufacturers. In one instance, the smart-speaker company
Sonos requested anonymized error rate data for when
consumers used the company’s speakers with Amazon’s digital
voice assistant, Alexa.131 Sonos wanted that data to improve
the quality of its speakers’ responses to voice commands.132
Amazon cited privacy as the reason for declining the request.133
Yet it offered no law in support of that assertion, because there
was no strong candidate.
An alternative explanation is that Amazon withheld the
anonymized error data to give Amazon’s own smart speaker
devices a competitive advantage through better access to
product quality information. After all, Amazon itself recorded
people’s conversations in their homes without users’
permission or even awareness.134 Moreover, Amazon shared
actual recordings of consumers’ in-home conversations with
independent consultants it had hired—thereby handing over
much more sensitive data to third parties than what Sonos
requested.135 Amazon’s broader behavior with respect to data
thus suggests Amazon may have been using privacy as a
pretext to keep anonymized voice data from Sonos.136
As a final example, Google abruptly stopped providing
advertisers with access even to users’ anonymized and
encrypted ID data, citing privacy.137 As a result, advertisers
130 For a helpful summary of the anticompetitive nature of Apple’s actions,
ironically funded by Facebook, see Sokol & Zhu, supra note 7.
131 Written Testimony of Eddie Lazarus Before Subcomm. on Competition
Pol’y, Antitrust, & Consumer Rts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong.
6 (2019).
132 Id.
133 Id. at 6–7.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Additionally, this is one example of Amazon’s broader competitive strategy
to systematically block others from accessing its data while simultaneously
collecting sensitive data from third-parties, including small businesses selling on
its marketplace. Amazon studies which third-party products are successful, and
then copies them, helped by its vast resources and control over the marketplace
searches. See Dana Mattioli, Amazon Scooped up Data from its own Sellers to
Launch
Competing
Products,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Apr.
23,
2020)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-scooped-up-data-from-its-own-sellersto-launch-competing-products-11587650015 [https://perma.cc/Q22U-HRYF].
137 See Complaint at ¶ 140, Texas v. Google LLC, No. 4:20-cv-00957 (E.D. Tex.
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had to depend on Google for analyzing the success of their
Google advertising, and they were required to pay a fee for
those analytics.138 No longer could advertisers go to third-party
analytics firms to determine which advertising was most
successful. Tellingly, after advertisers paid for Google’s extra
service, they could once again access encrypted user IDs.139
Google also purchased transaction data from MasterCard and
other financial institutions, which it used to match in-store
purchases with Google advertising, and then shared those
insights with advertisers.140 These accompanying activities
suggest that, despite its claims, Google was not driven to block
access because of some overriding desire to protect people from
having their information transferred to third parties.
Business use of privacy to block competitor access is not
limited to the examples in this section. Other online platforms,
such as LinkedIn, have cited privacy to justify blocking
startups from data that the platforms themselves sell to
others.141 Many other platforms, including Twitter, sell access
to user data, as do data brokers.142 Moreover, some of the
pretexts discussed in the following section on digital helpers,
like those used by financial institutions, also undermine
businesses with some competing product overlap. These
examples suggest that online platforms widely use privacy as
a justification for blocking competitors from accessing
information. As more industries monetize data, and thereby
overlap more with one another, these pretexts have the
potential to expand even further.
The examples in this Section share some common features
that can begin to help to identify privacy pretexts. The
business asserting privacy often engages in inconsistent
Dec. 16, 2020).
138 Id.
139 Id.; see also Dina Srinivasan, Why Google Dominates Advertising Markets:
Competition Policy Should Lean on the Principles of Financial Market Regulation,
24 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 55, 102–06 (2020).
140 Mark Bergen & Jennifer Surane, Google and Mastercard Cut a Secret Ad
Deal
to
Track
Retail
Sales,
BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
31,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/google-andmastercard-cut-a-secret-ad-deal-to-track-retail-sales [https://perma.cc/Z5FXBH6X].
141 HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2019).
142 See Erin Bernstein & Theresa J. Lee, Where the Consumer is the
Commodity: The Difficulty with the Current Definition of Commercial Speech, 2013
MICH. ST. L. REV. 39, 62 (2013); Thomas E. Kadri, Platforms as Blackacres, 68
UCLA L. REV. 1184, 1219 (2022).
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behavior, such as not subjecting their own collection of data to
the same protections they’re imposing on others (Apple) or
selling the same access that they’re claiming to block in the
name of privacy (Facebook). Additionally, privacy pretexts
allow some monetary gain—beyond consumer good will—to the
incumbent from asserting the privacy interest. Finally, and
most importantly, each example raises the possibility of
harming markets by weakening competition. Related themes
can be seen in the following sections.
2. Keeping Information from Digital Helpers
Incumbents employ privacy pretexts not only to keep
information from direct competitors but also to undermine
third parties that consumers choose to use for help in dealing
with the incumbents. This behavior is concerning because
digital helpers can improve consumer welfare by lowering
prices, adding convenience, and giving consumers greater
choice.143 For instance, Expedia makes it easier to search
among airlines for the best flight, while mortgage calculators
help home buyers find the lowest interest rate.144 Companies
use two main avenues to block information from digital
helpers: institutional and legal.
a. Institutional Mechanisms for Blocking Information
from Private Actors
A company can use its relationship with customers to limit
third-party information access. The most powerful relational
mechanism for control is the customer account. A case study
comes from finance. A new generation of financial technology
companies (“fintechs”), like Mint, NerdWallet, and Credit
Karma, originally sought to democratize financial savvy by
advising consumers how best to save, invest, and borrow. For
these digital assistants to be most helpful, they need details
about the individual’s financial profile, much of which is most
readily available in the customer’s existing financial
accounts.145
Personal data is necessary for providing
143 This effect is in addition to any improvements provided by directly
competing with the incumbents, and some digital helpers do both advising and
competing. See generally Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, supra note 7, at 830–
33 (discussing promise and risks of empowering digital intermediaries like
Expedia).
144 See, e.g., id. at 835–36 (describing AI’s potential to expedite mortgage
application processes).
145 See Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive, supra note 7, at 240.
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consumer financial advice because credit products are priced
based on factors like income and non-payment risk. Yet it is
prohibitively time-intensive for individuals to go to each bank’s
website, enter their personal information, and get a quote.
That is one reason why approximately half of all home buyers
get only one quote on their mortgage, often costing them tens
of thousands of dollars in higher interest rates over the course
of the loan.146 Consumers decide to share personal financial
information with fintechs largely with the goal of saving
money.147
Given these intermediaries’ potential to help consumers
find lower prices, it is unsurprising that incumbent financial
institutions have resisted them. Banks sell a large array of
consumer financial products beyond checking accounts, such
as credit cards and loans. Banks thus prefer that the customer
look to them for all products, rather than allowing fintechs to
help consumers shop around.
Consequently, in fintechs’ early days, at a critical time
when they could have rapidly attracted a large base of
customers, Bank of America, Capital One, and other
incumbents technologically blocked fintechs from accessing
customer accounts, despite customers granting access.148
Banks justified the move with anti-intrusion norms, citing
security concerns.149 These barriers matter even if banks could
not outright block fintechs permanently due to regulatory
pressure and customer demand.150 Even temporary blocking
of a fintech’s access can cause consumers to be frustrated with
the fintech during a crucial early period of adoption. Many
fintechs have had to either strike agreements with banks or
continually update their systems to work around barriers
146 See Richard Cordray, Foreword: Consumer Protection in the Financial
Marketplace, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 323 (2015).
147 See id.
148 Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1286 (2017)
(discussing this strategy).
149 See Nathan DiCamillo, Capital One Mends Fences with One Aggregator,
Deepens Relationship with Another, AM. BANKER (Aug. 10, 2018),
https://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/capital-one-mends-fences-withaggregators-opens-access-to-data?brief=00000158-07c7-d3f4-a9f937df9bc10000 [https://perma.cc/J8MH-CJWZ]; Memorandum from Rebecca
Heironimus, Managing Vice President, Capital One Fin. Corp., to the Consumer
Fin. Protection Bureau 5, 10 (Feb. 18, 2020). Data aggregators now play a central
role in this issue of sharing data. See Nizan Geslevich Packin, Show Me the (Data
About the) Money!, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 1277, 1331 (2020).
150 See, e.g., infra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing the CFPB’s
issuance of guidance).
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banks create, thereby raising costs or making them dependent
on banks for seamless access.151
Banks also tried another approach to gain control: direct
communications to consumers. For example, Bank of America
sent out an email titled “Important information about using
third-party apps and websites.”152 The email told consumers
that “[s]haring your login information can be risky” and went
on to summarize those risks, which include the possibility that
the login information given to the third party would be
compromised.153
Instead, Bank of America encouraged
consumers to use the third-party app through their Security
Center.154 When consumers agree to do so, they are giving
Bank of America additional power over the third-party tool,
making it less likely that the tool can offer services that the
bank dislikes.
These dynamics may explain why most fintechs rapidly
moved away from their founding goals of advising consumers
on the best market choices.155
Instead, they began
emphasizing other forms of advice that would not direct
business away from banks, such as how much to save rather
than invest. By controlling account access, banks force
fintechs to be careful about offering any product that might
threaten banks’ interests in retaining customers. Customer
use of the Security Center would give Bank of America control
over which third-party apps obtain access and what
information the apps can see. That control thus enables Bank
of America to influence data flows for its profits at the expense
of data management.
To be clear, protecting privacy in financial information is
important. Financial data is among the most sensitive types
of information, and “[i]f an individual’s financial information is
placed in the wrong hands, it can have significant
consequences.”156 However, banks did not calibrate their
response to focus on security and allow full fintech access
upon request by the customer. Instead, they proceeded in a
manner that maximized bank control and obstruction of third
151

See id.
See Facebook Leaked Documents, supra note 1, at 876–89.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 See Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, supra note 7.
156 Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1125, 1155
(2015).
152
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parties. Additionally, it is debatable whether a bank’s decadesold security system is superior to that of a technology company
that built its systems only a few years ago, especially since
banks typically build newer features onto their clunky legacy
information systems.157
Either way, banks’ declarations of privacy motivations are
inconsistent with how they collect large amounts of customer
information while transferring that data to affiliates and
insufficiently investing in data security.158 Their informationblocking actions are more consistent with banks’ widespread
fear that fintech startups will disrupt the industry’s high profit
margins, which are boosted by limited consumer information
and rationality.159 By hindering fintechs, banks have helped
not only to limit consumers’ product choices but also to keep
consumers without powerful financial advisors to decide
among existing choices.
b. Legal Mechanisms for Blocking Information from
Private Actors
So far in Part I, the privacy pretext examples have been
rhetorical. The pretexts were communicated to customers,
competitors, or the public. Although the communications were
presumably also made with an eye toward future lawsuits or
regulatory action, as demonstrated by Facebook’s internal
emails,160 they were not immediately legal arguments.
Companies can also directly apply pretexts to the law, either
by repurposing existing privacy laws or by influencing the
shape of new legal rules.
The CFAA provides an example of repurposing an existing
law. Various incumbents have used this antihacking statute
to block other digital tools from accessing even information
readily available on the internet.161 Consider Power Ventures,
157 See Penny Crosman, Is Finra’s Dire Warning About Data Aggregators on
Target?,
AM.
BANKER,
(Apr.
9,
2018),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/is-finras-dire-warning-about-dataaggregators-on-target [https://perma.cc/9AAA-YWUF].
158 See id.
159 See Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive, supra note 7, at 238–
41.
160 See, e.g., E-mail from Marne Levine, Vice President of Glob. P’ships, Bus.
and Corp. Dev., Facebook, Inc., to Elliot Schrage, Vice President of Glob.
Commc’ns, Mktg., and Pub. Pol’y, Facebook (Jan. 27, 2013, 1:11 PM) (on file with
author).
161 See supra note 17 and accompanying text; Andrew Sellars, Twenty Years
of Web Scraping and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
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which in 2008 unveiled a single interface that aggregated
multiple social networks.162 Rather than going to Facebook to
get news, users could go to Power.com and aggregate feeds
from several different social networks.163 Users could post on
Power Ventures and distribute the message across several
networks.164 These features also provided more control over
users’ information flows through third-party access.165
That kind of interoperability, at a time when Facebook had
only a fraction of its current users, might have enabled a less
concentrated social media landscape, yet one where the value
of being part of a large network was still preserved.166 But
Facebook argued that Power Ventures had engaged in
unauthorized access under the CFAA.167 The lawsuit, which
Facebook won, forced Power Ventures to shut down.168 The
social network has since then continued to use the CFAA to
block or limit third-party access.169
More recently, Facebook has blocked even web browsers
that offered heightened choice and privacy. One example is
the Friendly browser, which prevents websites from tracking
users and allows users to sort the Facebook news feed
chronologically, which poses a threat to Facebook’ strategy of
only prioritizing news that keep users engaged.170 These
L. 372, 378–81 (2018). For an excellent in-depth discussion of the CFAA from a
property rather than a privacy perspective, see Thomas E. Kadri, Digital
Gatekeepers, 99 TEX. L. REV. 951, 971–72 (2021).
162 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir.
2016).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 1063.
165 See id.
166 On the importance of interoperability in social media, see FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA ET AL., STAN. CYBER POL’Y CTR., REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
PLATFORM
SCALE
26–27
(2020),
https://fsi-live.s3.us-west1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/platform_scale_whitepaper_-cpc-pacs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z3Q9-9MT6]; Kadri, supra note 142, at 993.
167 Power Ventures, 844 F.3d at 1064. Facebook also made a related claim
under a similar California law. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 2020) (making
it a crime to access a computer network without permission).
168 Power Ventures, 844 F.3d at 1062.
169 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. BrandTotal Ltd., 499 F. Supp. 3d 720 (N.D. Cal.
2020) (allowing Facebook to pursue its CFAA claim based on third-party privacy
grounds).
170 See Letter from Andrew Crocker, Senior Staff Att’y, Elec. Frontier Found.,
& Mitch Stolz, Senior Staff Att’y, Elec. Frontier Found., to Ms. del Fierro,
Facebook,
&
Mr.
Sherman,
Facebook
(Nov.
20,
2020)
(https://www.eff.org/document/eff-letter-facebook-re-friendly)
[https://perma.cc/FK6K-KCNV].
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information-blocking
moves
seem
inconsistent
with
Facebook’s declarations that it protects privacy by providing
users “with transparency and control over how their data is
used.”171
Other incumbents, including Amazon, have used the CFAA
to block price comparison tools. In one instance, an app called
PriceZombie allowed consumers to compare prices across all
major retailers, including Amazon.172 The app also advised
consumers on whether to wait to purchase an item.173 After
quickly growing its user base to over 60,000 active users,
PriceZombie suddenly found Amazon blocking its information
access.174 Without the ability to collect information from the
largest U.S. online marketplace, it rapidly lost customers and
folded.175
More broadly, lawyers who work with startups have
observed an increasing tendency to tie anti-scraping litigation
to privacy concerns.176 It is impossible to know how influential
these innovators might have been on platform concentration.
However, these user tools have sought to open the social media
echo chamber and lower prices of online marketplaces. The
resulting lack of alternatives may have deprived people of
innovation, choice, and the full benefits of the data economy.
Firms also make legal arguments by shaping rulemaking
or enforcement. Tasked by Congress with writing rules for
financial information sharing, the CFPB ultimately did what
banks had requested: it declined to write a rule forcing banks
to share information with consumer-approved digital
helpers.177 Instead, the agency released a set of nonbinding

171 See
FACEBOOK
FOR
BUSINESS,
https://www.facebook.com/business/small-business/personalized-ads
(last
visited July 25, 2021) [https://perma.cc/4NSM-QDLK].
172 PriceZombie Shutting Down End of the Month Because of Amazon, REDDIT,
https://www.reddit.com/r/PriceZombie/comments/4ar70l/pricezombie_shutti
ng_down_end_of_the_month [https://perma.cc/PGG2-7HR2].
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Interview with Massachusetts Lawyer (June 2021) (observing that
businesses are becoming more skilled at tying anti-scraping arguments to
privacy).
177 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER PROTECTION PRINCIPLES:
CONSUMER-AUTHORIZED FINANCIAL DATA SHARING AND AGGREGATION (2017),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-reports/consumerprotection-principles-consumer-authorized-financial-data-sharing-andaggregation/ [https://perma.cc/9VJU-JAAU].
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principles for industry to consult.178 The agency’s main reason
for declining to write a rule was concern about data security
and privacy, as bank lobbyists had stressed.179
This outcome is unsatisfactory from a data management
perspective because the absence of a clear legal obligation puts
legacy financial institutions in a position of informational
control over consumer tools. Facing a similar question, the
U.K. and other countries have opted to require banks to share
information with fintechs.180
It is difficult to know the full implications of the
misappropriation of the CFAA and broader use of privacy to
slow, coopt, or shut down consumer tools. In 2020 and 2021
courts curtailed CFAA abuse and recognized that expansive
readings of the CFAA would turn “each website into its own
criminal jurisdiction and each webmaster into his own
legislature.”181 But other privacy arguments remain, and
because of the CFAA many different businesses and digital
helpers never had a chance to fully launch during the most
attractive early window of growth opportunity for competitors
and digital assistants. Some of these could have significantly
altered the platform ecosystem at a crucial time in its
development. Thus, privacy pretexts’ harms to consumers,
markets, and innovation are potentially immense.
B. Blocking Regulatory Information
Businesses have attempted to use anti-intrusion norms to
fight against a crucial tool for accountability: information
collection.
This move targets three main categories of
regulatory information. First, for laws that depend on private
enforcement, individuals initiating lawsuits require access to
information through discovery.
Second, administrative
agencies, like the FTC and CFPB, rely on either ex post

178

Id.
See id.
180 See, e.g., COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY, RETAIL BANKING MARKET
INVESTIGATION
649
(Aug.
9,
2016),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57ac9667e5274a0f6c00007a/r
etail-banking-market-investigation-full-final-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LN9T-UG75] (mandating financial interoperability).
181 Sandvig v. Barr, 451 F. Supp. 3d 73, 88 (D.D.C. 2020); see also Van Buren
v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1662 (2021) (limiting CFAA liability to
unauthorized access, not authorized access for an improper purpose). The extent
to which this ruling will remove the CFAA from privacy pretexts remains unclear.
179
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investigations or ongoing monitoring for compliance.182 Third,
independent researchers collect data to identify legal
violations, thereby alerting authorities to the need to act.
In the first of these categories, court discovery, individuals
trying to enforce their rights have sometimes met an
informational wall built on anti-intrusion arguments. In one
representative case, class action lawyers sued Joe’s Crab
Shack, a nationwide restaurant chain, for minimum-wage
violations.183 Joe’s Crab Shack tried to prevent the plaintiff
from using employee contact information by citing the privacy
interests of the employees.184 The defendants did not mention
any specific law, but rather seemed to be appealing to the
court’s general sense of privacy.185 As another example, in a
securities fraud case, a bank had allegedly dumped “insider”
stock but the bank argued it should not have to provide
information about clients “due to privacy considerations.”186
Sometimes defendants cite a specific statute—such as the
main
consumer
financial
privacy
statute,
Gramm-Leach-Bliley—to fight discovery.187
Turning to administrative agencies, businesses have
attacked information collection both in a generalized manner
and as a matter of law. To illustrate the more generalized
manner, consider how bank lobbyists’ complaints about data
security affected the CFPB in 2017, when President Trump
appointed Mick Mulvaney as acting director of the agency. One
of Mulvaney’s first moves was to freeze all data collection,
which reflected banks’ complaints about data security.188 That
move impeded the agency’s regulatory function because the
182 See Rory Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance
Era, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 398 (2019).
183 Hart v. Crab Addison, Inc., No. 13-cv-6458 (W.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 28, 2013).
184 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Compel and for
a Protective Order at 15, Hart v. Crab Addison, Inc., No. 13-cv-6458 (W.D.N.Y.
Nov. 2, 2015), 2015 WL 10435296 (arguing the data “infringes on the privacy” of
the listed employees).
185 See id.
186 In re Cases Relating to First National Bank of Keystone, No. 99-cv-0992
(S.D.W. Va. filed Nov. 8, 1999).
187 See, e.g., Union Planters Bank, N.A. v. Gavel, No. CIV.A. 02-1224, 2003
WL 1193671 (E.D. La. Mar. 12, 2003), vacated and remanded sub nom. Union
Planters Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2004) (issuing an
injunction barring release of information in response to a subpoena because the
release would purportedly violate Gramm-Leach-Bliley).
188 See John Heltman, Warren Grills CFPB Head Over Data Collection Freeze,
AM. BANKER (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/warrengrills-cfpb-head-over-data-collection-freeze [https://perma.cc/RG43-EXV3].

VAN LOO PE1 TECH EDIT

2022]

9/10/20222:08 PM

PRIVACY PRETEXTS

135

CFPB must know what happens to individual consumers to
determine, for instance, whether they have been subject to
discriminatory, unfair, or deceptive lending practices. Given
the importance of data collection to the agency, a halt “is a way
to essentially cripple the agency.”189 Mulvaney’s motives were
suspect because he had previously fought the creation of the
CFPB and later publicly stated that it should not exist.190
A subsequent Inspector General report revealed that
Mulvaney’s concerns were exaggerated and Mulvaney was
forced to lift the data collection freeze.191 Nonetheless, for
months, anti-intrusion warnings by industry had succeeded in
shutting down an important regulator’s ability to represent
consumers’ informational interests in the financial sector.
The CFPB data freeze is one instance of a larger sphere of
industry lobbying. Industry regularly lobbies against new
information collection rules by citing privacy concerns. For
example, in 2016 the CFPB sought to collect more data to
determine whether mortgage lenders were discriminating
based on race.192 Industry pushed back on privacy grounds,
even though the additional data requested was mostly about
the loan characteristics.193 The personal data points to be
collected—age and credit score—would be anonymized and
could be easily purchased from private sector actors.194
In addition to those more rhetorical, advocacy-related
privacy pretexts, regulators have found their formal requests
for information regularly resisted on similar grounds in court.
189 John Heltman, Is CFPB’s Data Freeze About Security or a Political Ploy?,
AM. BANKER (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/is-cfpbsdata-freeze-about-security-or-a-political-ploy?brief=00000158-07c7-d3f4-a9f937df9bc10000 [https://perma.cc/6TCC-8W8H].
190 See David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Implementing Privacy Policy:
Who Should do What?, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1117, 1140
(2019).
191 See U.S. Off. of Inspector Gen., 2018-IT-C-003, Rep. on the Indep. Audit
of the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau’s Priv. Program 2, 4–5 (2018) (finding most of
the allegations unfounded but observing that some employees had left phones
and laptops unattended in the CFPB’s office, and recommending better CFPB
inventory of all of the personal information it collected).
192 12 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2018).
193 Craig Nazzaro, Editorial, CFPB Must Address Lenders’ HMDA Data Privacy
Concerns,
AM.
BANKER
(July
5,
2016),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/cfpb-must-address-lenders-hmdadata-privacy-concerns [https://perma.cc/68NG-EW92].
194 Security
and
Privacy,
QUICKEN
LOANS
(Jan.
1,
2021),
https://www.quickenloans.com/about/legal/security-privacy
[https://perma.cc/L7U5-7TAC]. Of course, the real concern here would be that
anonymized data can be de-anonymized.
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For example, in 2011 the FTC investigated a debt collection
firm, West Asset Management, for harassing, threatening, and
lying to consumers; targeting the wrong individuals for
collection action; and improperly withdrawing funds from its
customers’ bank accounts without authorization.195 In an
effort to find witnesses and evidence, the FTC sought access to
customer files.196 West Asset Management resisted on privacy
grounds, citing the possibility that the FTC might hand over
such information to third parties.197
Businesses have made similar arguments in FTC
investigations ranging from a hospital merger to fraud
investigations following Volkswagen’s falsifying of air pollution
tests.198 One magazine subscription service that had engaged
in abusive and deceptive telemarketing practices fought a Civil
Investigatory Demand issued for customer subscription lists
by dubbing itself “essentially the guardian of its customers’
and employees’ private information.”199
Other agencies, such as the Department of Labor and
CFPB, have faced related resistance to formal information
requests of businesses, under statutes such as HIPAA,
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,200 and the Family Educational Rights

195 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Leading Debt Collector Agrees to Pay
Record
$2.8
Million
to
Settle
FTC
Charges
(Mar.
16,
2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/03/leading-debtcollector-agrees-pay-record-28-million-settle-ftc
[https://perma.cc/9WXZRL4M].
196 FTC Letter Ruling Affirming Denial of West Asset Mgmt, Inc.’s Petition to
Limit Civil Investigative Demand at 3, FTC File No. 0723006 (July 2, 2008).
197 FTC Letter Ruling Denying West Asset Mgmt.’s Petition to Limit Civil
Investigative Demand at 2, FTC File No. 0723006 (Apr. 18, 2008) (quoting West
Asset Management’s petition arguing “the requests require the disclosure of
confidential and personally identifiable consumer and client information”).
198 See In re Civil Investigative Demand, 2016 F.T.C. LEXIS 30, *13 (F.T.C.
Feb. 25, 2016) (resisting a CID on privacy grounds as part of a fraud investigation
related to the Volkswagen emissions scandal); In re Proposed Acquisition by the
Hosp. Auth. of Albany-Dougherty Cnty. of Palmyra Park Med. Ctr., Inc. from
Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc., Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc.’s Petition to Quash or
Limit Subpoena and Civil Investigative Demand, File No. 111-0067 at 10 (F.T.C.
filed Feb. 25, 2011) (opposing a CID for parts of a hospital’s anonymized patient
files to determine information such as prices as part of a merger challenge).
199 In re Civil Investigative Demand Issued on May 6, 2013, to Countrywide
Periodicals, LLC, Petition to Quash Civil Investigative Demand, File No. 123145
at 4 (May 31, 2013).
200 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Koresko v. Chao, No. 05-1501, 2006 WL
1455400 (U.S. filed Mar. 16, 2006) (outlining an extensive resistance to
Department of Labor ERISA request based on the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and
HIPAA).
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and Privacy Act.201 These diverse challenges to regulators all
rely on norms of anti-intrusion. The intrusion is either the
court or regulator obtaining sensitive information, or the
possibility that, once collected, that information might be
further disclosed. These arguments have typically failed in
court due to longstanding precedent for declining to recognize
the sensitivity of information as a defense to such regulatory
information demands.202
However, it is of limited consolation that these privacy
pretexts often fail as a matter of law, or only freeze data
temporarily. Temporary halts to information collection can
still cause harm by burdening and slowing regulators.
Regulation works best when information transfers smoothly
from industry to agency. Consider how Facebook’s annual
revenues are over 200 times the FTC’s annual funding, and
Facebook is only one of many large companies the agency must
regulate.203 Even if the arguments ultimately fail in court,
fighting pretexts can still limit the total amount of regulation
by diverting scarce resources.
Other targets of privacy pretexts include journalists and
academics.
Although these groups are not technically
regulators, their findings often spur regulatory action,
particularly at an agency like the FTC, which does not have
regulatory monitoring authority enabling it to routinely collect
nonpublic information.204 Academics and journalists who
reveal problematic practices can thus be seen as a valuable

201 See Center for Excellence in Higher Education, CFPB No. 2019-MISCCenter for Excellence in Higher Education-0001 at 9–11 (Aug. 18, 2019) (resisting
a predatory student lending investigation). For other CFPB examples, see In re
Civil Investigative Demand Issued to American International Group, Inc., United
Guaranty’s Petition to Modify or Set Aside June 20, 2012 Civil Investigative
Demand 17–18 (CFPB filed Dec. 7, 2012) (challenging the collection of
“confidential consumer information” by arguing that the CFPB could, as long as
it provided notice, later hand over that information to third parties); In re
Firstsource Advantage, LLC, Petition to Set Aside or Modify the Bureau’s Second
Civil Investigative Demand at 40 (CFPB filed Oct. 18) (relying on general privacy
notions).
202 See e.g., FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶
69,338, at 65,353 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d, 965 F.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(holding that the confidential or sensitive nature of the required materials is not
a proper basis for limiting the Commission’s information demands).
203 Leah Nylen, FTC Suffering a Cash Crunch as it Prepares to Battle Facebook,
POLITICO (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/10/ftccash-facebook-lawsuit-444468 [https://perma.cc/8JCU-EMR3].
204 See generally, Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors, supra note 182, at 384–86
(comparing degrees of regulatory monitoring authority among agencies).

VAN LOO PE1 TECH EDIT

138

9/10/20222:08 PM

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol.108:PPP

part of the privacy regulatory framework.205
For this reason, platforms seek to block independent
accountability projects. For example, in 2020, Facebook sent
a cease and desist letter to New York University researchers
studying
the
social
network’s
amplification
of
misinformation.206 The letter explained that legal action was
possible because the research information collection posed a
“privacy threat” to users.207 Although the social network
backed away from a lawsuit, it still ultimately cut off the
researchers’ access by making a baseless claim that it needed
to comply with a privacy settlement it entered into with the
FTC.208
***
The prominence of anti-intrusion privacy norms has
created abundant opportunities for pretextual legal and
rhetorical arguments.
The full impact cannot be solely
measured by what is found in court records. There is reason
to think that the threats of costly litigation and accompanying
reputational harms have discouraged some academics and
journalists from collecting information from powerful
businesses.209 Moreover, much administrative regulation lies
in the gray area of enforcement discretion. By providing
incumbent businesses with a means of challenging a variety of
data collection requests, privacy forces regulators and
205 Cf. Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth
for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV.
277, 279, 281–85 (2004) (outlining an array of important informal mechanisms
for regulatory information collection).
206 Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Seeks Shutdown of NYU Research Project into
Political
Ad
Targeting,
WALL
ST .
J.
(Oct.
23,
2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-seeks-shutdown-of-nyu-researchproject-into-political-ad-targeting-11603488533
[https://perma.cc/G4SRN5X9].
207 Id.
208 The claim is suspect because the FTC settlement agreement was about
third-party service providers. See Decision and Order, In re Facebook, Inc., No.
092-3184
at
3–4
(F.T.C.
July
27,
2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810face
bookdo.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5TK-YPRW]; see also Samuel Levine, Letter from
Acting Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection Samuel Levin to Facebook,
CONSUMER
BLOG
(Aug.
5,
2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/blogposts/2021/08/letter-acting-director-bureau-consumer-protection-samuellevine-facebook [https://perma.cc/TAE9-57R8] (publicly rejecting Facebook’s
reliance on the FTC settlement as justification); Kadri, supra note 142, at 1188.
209 Brief for Kyratso Karahalios et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648 (2021) (No. 19-783), 2020 WL
3966114 at 17.
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entrepreneurs into defensive positions. Privacy arguments
thus risk having a broad chilling effect that makes it harder for
laws, norms, and markets to hold businesses accountable.
III
THE ARCHITECTURE OF PRIVACY PRETEXTS
Each category of pretext—blocking information from
competitors, consumer helpers, regulators, and researchers—
merits nuanced attention. Nonetheless, they all share a
common structure. Each applies norms of anti-intrusion to
block data management help from third parties. Each also
gains persuasive power from privacy’s aversion to economics
and third-party access. This Part discusses these features in
turn. Recognizing the structure helps not only to identify
problematic pretexts, but also to develop prescriptions.
A. Privacy Pretexts as Control
Privacy pretexts function by leveraging anti-intrusion fears
to weaken data management. Consumers want help from
digital assistants in navigating a complex commercial
landscape. Users want choice in social media platforms.
Plaintiffs seek access to records providing evidence of injuries
caused by businesses. Regulators must inspect the use of data
sets to hold companies accountable to the law. —without
which those companies would have greater power over the
individuals sharing their data Smaller businesses need data to
be able to challenge incumbents. In these and related
contexts, a focus on optimally managing data to advance the
interests of those providing the data would support allowing
data transfers. Yet businesses warn of the specter of intrusion
to divert attention from the benefits of allowing information
flows.
These moves violate the basic data management tenet that
personal data should not be used to harm the subjects of that
data. If businesses can harness personal data to cause market
failures, they can raise prices, reduce choice, and dampen
innovation. Those effects are to the economic detriment of the
individuals whose data they collected.
In addition to those individualized data management
harms, privacy pretexts implicate more collective data
management interests. Those interests emphasize the benefits
to society when markets provide information to actors who can
best deploy it. This paradigm allows for balancing economic
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goals with noneconomic values, such as human flourishing
and the democratic desire for an informed electorate.
Privacy pretexts harm individual and collective data
management interests through a common institutional
mechanism: cutting off third-party access. When businesses
block a fintech from providing mortgage advice or stopping
Power Ventures from allowing individuals to access multiple
social media sites in one place, anti-intrusion norms prevent
individuals from benefitting from their contributions to the
data ecosystem. If a patient is able to access a health file or
an employee can collect colleagues’ contact information to
initiate a class action, individuals are better able to advance
their own legal interests with respect to the business. From a
collective perspective, by blocking information from consumer
tools and competitors, businesses make markets less effective
as viewed through both neoclassical and behavioral
economics.210 By blocking tools and market incentives that
could help address misinformation and electoral manipulation,
privacy pretexts can undermine democracy.211
Blocking regulatory information involves the same basic
concepts because regulators are third-party actors managing
data on behalf of individuals.
Proof that telemarketers
defrauded people requires the regulatory collection of at least
some personal information, such as names and phone
numbers.212 Enforcement of debt collection laws requires
regulatory analysis of customer data, such as contact
information and the amount of the debt incurred.213 By
invoking anti-intrusion principles, businesses obstruct the
flow of information to administrative agencies, researchers,
and courts. These parties play crucial roles in protecting
individuals’ interests and promoting general stewardship of
information resources. Each major pretext used to block
third-party information access undermines either the
individualized or collective conception of data management
goals.
This misuse of anti-intrusion to block data management
depends on the highly localized nature of privacy norms. Helen
210

These points are expanded upon infra section III.B.2.
Cf. FUKUYAMA, RICHMAN, GOEL, KATZ, MELAMED & SCHAAKE, supra note 166,
at 34–35 (explaining the value of middleware in diluting the outsized editorial
control of large, dominant platforms).
212 See supra Section II.B. (discussing telemarketing privacy pretexts).
213 Id. (discussing debt collection privacy pretexts).
211
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Nissenbaum’s influential work conceives of privacy in terms of
“contextual integrity.”214 Under this view, privacy wrongs
occur when actors violate the contextual norms for information
flows.215
Different contexts—doctors’ offices, banks, and
grocery stores—have their own norms about what information
is appropriate to be collected from whom, and transferred to
whom.216 Appropriateness varies not only based on the
industry—such as health care versus retail shopping—but also
on whether the third party receiving the medical records is,
say, a surgeon rather than one’s employer.217
By strategically stressing anti-intrusion in very specific
contexts where it benefits them, businesses can block
information flow to regulators, researchers, competitors, and
digital assistants. Those same businesses can simultaneously
encourage information flows in other contexts where
profitable, such as their own collection of data from customers,
by emphasizing different norms associated with data
management. The following sections will show how privacy
pathologies facilitate this use of pretexts for contextual control.
B. How Privacy Is Hospitable to Pretexts
The strategy of employing anti-intrusion norms to
undercut data management works in part because
anti-intrusion norms are more visceral. People inherently
grasp the threat of an invader watching them or entering their
private space to collect information. Conversely, for data
management, the harms inflicted (or opportunities missed) are
less instinctually alarming
This difference in danger salience is material to
understanding why an emphasis on anti-intrusion eclipses
other issues. But salience is only part of the story. Privacy
pretexts also gain strength from the field’s tension with (1)
economics and (2) third-party access.
1. Norms: The Subversion of Economics
Privacy pretexts exploit the field’s tense relationship with
economics.
When privacy advocates and scholars have
proposed regulation, they have consistently faced resistance
214 See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV.
119 (2004).
215 See id. at 151.
216 See id. at 138.
217 See id. at 153.
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rooted in economics. Common arguments emphasize the high
cost of privacy regulation,218 deprivation of consumers’ free
choice,219 and harm to innovation.220 As Richard Posner put it,
“people should not—on economic grounds, in any event—have
a right to conceal material facts about themselves.”221 Privacy
scholars have understandably sought to deprioritize
economics because, when weighed against efficiency, “privacy
comes up the loser.”222
However, inattention to economic justifications deprives
data management of powerful normative foundations. That
inattention is most evident in efficiency and, to a lesser extent,
distributional justice.223 Efficiency is the single most
persuasive rationale for convincing policy makers to enact new
224 market regulations.
By depriving digital helpers of data
under the guise of privacy, businesses undermine informed
and rational consumer decisions that are necessary for
efficient markets.225
Privacy pretexts further undermine
efficiency if they conceal platform moves that build monopoly
power.226
Also, preventing regulators from collecting
information deprives regulators of the information they need to
address market failures.227 Thus, there are strong efficiency
218 See Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules
and the Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 640 (2002) (observing that the most
common concern expressed by payers and providers over proposed HIPAA privacy
rules were the high costs).
219 Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market’s Consumer
Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 97 (2013) (“If the analogy
between data collection and payment made in a voluntary market exchange is
persuasive, then information privacy regulation must be judged in light of the
risk that it will disrupt this functioning market.”).
220 Yafit Lev-Aretz & Katherine J. Strandburg, Privacy Regulation and
Innovation Policy, 22 YALE J.L. & TECH. 256, 258–59 (2020).
221 Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 399 (1978).
222 See Cohen, What Privacy is for, supra note 28, at 1904 (“[W]hen privacy
and its purportedly outdated values must be balanced against the cutting-edge
imperatives of national security, efficiency, and entrepreneurship, privacy comes
up the loser.”); see also SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 62, at 76–90,
228.
223 In response to accusations that Julie Cohen has shown how privacy is
essential for innovation, to counter charges that privacy is anti-innovation. See
Cohen, What Privacy is for, supra note 28, at 1906.
224 See Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K.
Sabeel Rahman, Building A Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the
Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1789–90 (2020).
225 See id.
226 See supra Part II.
227 See David E. M. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and
Regulation, in PUBLIC REGULATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON INSTITUTIONS AND
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arguments against privacy pretexts. Yet the scholars who
argue for the efficiency benefits of data management focus on
areas outside of privacy, like business law and contracts.228
Addressing the aforementioned market failures related to
consumer decisions and monopoly power can also be viewed
through the lens of distributive justice. Both uninformed
decisions and monopoly power raise prices, causing potentially
substantial regressive transfers of wealth across the
economy.229
Data management principles that empower
rational decisions, competition, and regulation can thus lead
to substantial progressive redistribution. While the privacy
literature
generally
recognizes
economic
harms
to
230
individuals, it rarely pays sustained attention to populationlevel distributional effects.231 Sustained distributive justice
arguments focused on data management, in particular, tend to
come from scholars who focus on other areas or remain largely
disconnected from the privacy literature.232
POLICIES 3–43, 22 (Elizabeth E. Baily ed., 1987).
228 See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Stone, supra note 33, at 454–55 (proposing machinereadable data sharing mandates to address consumer market pricing failures);
Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, supra note 7 (explaining the economic
potential for digital assistants that have access to data).
229 See Bar-Grill & Stone, supra note 33, at 453–54 (explaining how carriers’
strategic pricing potentially results in a potentially regressive $13.35 billion
annual reduction in consumer surplus); Rory Van Loo, Broadening Consumer
Law: Competition, Protection, and Distribution, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211 (2019)
(arguing that higher prices associated with consumer market failures have
potentially significant regressive effects that could be ameliorated with
information-forcing regulation); Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1316–17 (2016) (concluding that anticompetitive conduct
increases economic inequality).
230 See, e.g., Citron & Solove, supra note 110, at 21–22 (arguing that collective
privacy harms are often ignored because they do lack the individualistic focus
courts associates with cognizable harm).
231 Cf. Sara S. Greene, Stealing (Identity) from the Poor, 106 MINN. L. REV. 59,
62 (2021) (noting that the raging scholarly debate about data breaches “overlooks
those most vulnerable to their consequences: those who are low-income”); Khiara
Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 121
(2011) (showing how the government’s supervision of pregnant poor mothers
demonstrates that they have fewer privacy rights than other groups); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Toward A Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010,
2010 (2013) (“Policy and academic debates over privacy rules tend not to
emphasize the distributive dimensions of those rules.”).
232 To the extent privacy is mentioned in the sources supra note 229, it is to
note in passing that the (anti-intrusion) privacy concerns should be addressed.
See, e.g., Van Loo, Broadening Consumer Law, supra note 229, at 253–54 (“The
privacy risks must also be weighed should regulators collect consumers’ personal
data.”). Antitrust scholar Nathan Newman has argued that search practices
contribute to economic inequality. See Nathan Newman, The Costs of Lost
Privacy: Consumer Harm and Rising Economic Inequality in the Age of Google, 40
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Despite strong economic arguments in favor of data
management, privacy scholars have not deployed them in the
same way that, say, intellectual property scholars do.233
Although privacy advocates and scholars have paid some
attention to economic harms from intrusion, they have
underinvested in analyzing economic gains from data
management.234
The limited attention to economic arguments facilitates
businesses’ ability to deploy self-serving normative
hierarchies. One of the strongest arguments used against
privacy regulation has drawn on a famous body of privacy
research known as the privacy paradox. In actual markets,
when consumers are spending real money, they choose
functionality, convenience, and low price over privacy.235 For
instance, given the choice between making a few dollars or
retaining their online browsing history privacy, consumers will
choose to hand over their data and take the money.236 This
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 849, 850 (2014). Salomé Viljoena and Julie Cohen have
deeply engaged with distributive justice issues, and thereby provided important
theoretical and normative foundations, albeit mostly subsumed within larger
treatments of collective governance, social inequality, and power. See Julie E.
Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1373, 1398 (2000) (“Personally-identified data is the wedge that enables
‘scientific,’ market-driven, and increasingly precise separation of ‘haves’ from
‘have-nots.’”); Salomé Viljoen, A Relational Theory of Data Governance, 131 YALE
L.J. 573, 586 (2021) (“Data relations can materialize unjust group-based
relations like racism, sexism, and classism.”).
233 See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 44, at 12, 35–46 (engaging with information
economics and stating that more attention is needed to “the complex reciprocal
relationship between our current ideas of politics, justice, efficiency, and
entitlement.”); JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS, OPEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CASEBOOK 1 (2021) (explaining how intellectual property, speech, competition
and privacy are four categories for information management that are often in
tension); see also Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond
Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 993 (2012) (“Although IP
scholars typically reason in the idiom of efficiency, a small but growing number
of them have begun to suggest that distributive justice values should also
influence information policy.”).
234 This is true of privacy beyond economic matters. See Neil Richards &
Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
431, 441 (2016) (concluding that privacy “is too focused on privacy’s costs, often
to the exclusion of any benefits”).
235 See Shara Monteleone, Addressing the ‘Failure’ of Informed Consent in
Online Data Protection: Learning the Lessons from Behaviour-Aware Regulation,
43 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 69, 86–90 (2015); but see Ari Ezra Waldman,
Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the ‘Privacy Paradox’, 31 CURRENT OP. IN
PSYCH. 105, 105 (2020) (arguing that the rational choice model does not account
for cognitive biases and platform design tricks that influence consumers).
236 See Spyros Kokolakis, Privacy Attitudes and Privacy Behavior: A Review of
Current Research on the Privacy Paradox Phenomenon, 64 COMPUTERS & SECURITY,
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conduct is seen as paradoxical because people say they value
privacy but fail to act accordingly.237 Opponents of regulation
have used that research to argue that costly restrictions on
data collection would go against what people most want.238
Privacy pretexts deploy an inverse narrative. They argue
for prioritizing anti-intrusion over price, choice, and
convenience.239 Consequently, a counterargument to privacy
pretexts would be to stress the privacy paradox research
suggesting that people value price, choice, and convenience
more than anti-intrusion.240 After all, those are the very
interests that privacy pretexts undermine.241
However, privacy’s normative framework is not well
positioned to make that case because privacy scholars—in
order to defend against attacks on valuable privacy policies—
have needed to argue against the privacy paradox.242 The
limited privacy attention to economic gains means that in
policy debates there is less likely to be consideration of the full
benefits to data management rules that would disadvantage
powerful incumbents.
Privacy pretexts thus help illustrate the downsides of the
field’s disconnect from economics. Since data management
principles have a stronger economic rationale than do
anti-intrusion principles, the deprioritization of economics
means that privacy’s anti-intrusion norms are more developed
than its data management norms.
That normative imbalance also allows firms to strategically
deploy economic arguments. When they seek to collect and
sell data, firms emphasize the economic benefits of allowing
such transfers as a reason to ignore the intrusion. Facebook,
for instance, has stressed that its access to users’ data is
crucial for offering its product for free and for helping small
businesses thrive.243 When businesses instead prefer to block
121, 121 (2017).
237 See id.
238 See Eric Goldman, The Privacy Hoax, FORBES (Oct. 14, 2002),
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2002/1014/042.html?sh=268831cc2717
[https://perma.cc/3AGN-MDCH].
239 See supra Part II.
240 See Kokolakis, supra note 236.
241 See supra Part II.A.
242 See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 235, at 105–07 (using non-economic
factors, such as practical hurdles, cognitive biases, and platform design, to argue
against the privacy paradox).
243 See Dan Levy, Speaking Up for Small Businesses, META (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://www.facebook.com/business/news/ios-14-apple-privacy-update-
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the transfer of the data they hold, they omit the economic
drawbacks while calling attention to the intrusion, as
Facebook did in selectively blocking third-party access.244
Businesses are thus dominating the economic narratives that
can heavily influence what individuals will see as the
appropriate norms for flow of information in a particular
context.
2. Institutions: Privacy’s Access Paradox
Privacy has an uneasy relationship with organizations
accessing data. Privacy scholars now certainly recognize the
importance of at least some third-party access , especially for
regulatory purposes.245 But much of the field’s most influential
scholarship over the past sixty years was animated by the need
to impose restrictions on information dissemination.246 Privacy
scholars have long worried that laws like FOIA that provide
transparency—which is a form of access—can be used to erode
privacy.247 One of privacy’s pioneers, Ruth Gavison, grouped
the constellation of underlying harms by defining privacy as “a
concern for limited accessibility.”248 In other words, privacy’s
normative imbalance helps to obscure the precise set of
pro-access interests that businesses also seek to obscure when
they use privacy pretexts. Privacy’s traditional anti-access
emphasis has thus paved a path for privacy pretexts.249
Part of the problem is that the importance of access was
less prominent in the main contexts in which anti-intrusion
norms developed. The individual did not require access to
learn that somebody had published sensitive information
impacts-small-business-ads
[https://perma.cc/9RQD-B8X4]
(emphasizing
Facebook’s opposition to Apple’s new data tracking restrictions on distributive
justice grounds).
244 See supra Part II.A.
245 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 27, at 555 (asserting “the establishment of
effective government oversight of data use” as one of the four necessary elements
of a data protection framework that approaches privacy as participation). Julie
Cohen has more broadly critiqued self-serving moral narratives and other
strategies that “tend to reinforce regimes of technical secrecy” and block public
access. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF, supra note 23, at 210–13.
246 See, e.g., WESTIN, supra note 7, at 7 (emphasizing privacy as “claim of
individuals . . . to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent
information about them is communicated to others214“).
247 See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 62, at 151 (warning of transparency laws’
threats to privacy).
248 See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423
(1980).
249 The main exception is in reference to individuals accessing their own data.
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about her in the newspaper, the main concern motivating The
Right to Privacy.250 When access entered the formative privacy
conversations of the 1970s, it was a much more
straightforward concept.
At that time, it mostly meant
individuals having access to their files, such as their credit
reports.251 From the perspective of the individual, such
mandates are not an intrusion.
Two institutional changes have since occurred that
accentuate the tension between access and anti-intrusion: one
to the regulatory state and the other to industrial organization.
When the Fair Credit Reporting Act was enacted, the CFPB did
not yet exist, and the Act’s primary enforcer, the FTC, did not
monitor credit reporting agencies to ensure compliance.252 The
idea that regulators should have ready access to private
businesses’ dealings with consumers was not as well
established.253 However, over the course of the twentieth
century, regulatory authority to patrol business conduct—
through routine environmental inspections, safety audits, and
bank examinations—steadily spread throughout much of the
administrative state.254 With the statutory creation of the
CFPB in 2010, regulatory monitoring on behalf of consumers
first arrived in full force.255 Regulatory monitoring, and thus
third-party access, is essential for the enforcement of data
management in an industrial landscape marked by large,
complex, and opaque corporations deploying massive data
sets.256
The second institutional shift is the rising societal
centrality of digital assistants. As markets have become more
complex and opaque, with myriad product characteristics,
multi-dimensional pricing structures, and lengthy contractual
terms, consumers have become less able to assess which
purchases are most attractive.257
Consumers’ individual

250

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 58, at 195.
See supra Part I; COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF, supra note
23, at 209.
252 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 84 (2008).
253 See Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors, supra note 182, at 393.
254 See id. at 384–92.
255 Id. at 394–95.
256 See Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State, supra note 9, at 1617–22.
257 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Regulating for Rationality, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1373,
1376 (2015) (explaining the implausibility of consumers making rational
decisions when faced with complicated contractual terms).
251
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access to massive data sets does little without the help of a
sophisticated third party, such as a product search engine,
that can analyze or organize the information.258 Similarly, in
the context of social media, the user may need an intermediary
tool for greater control over the news received and
dissemination of content posted.259 As more of social and
commercial life has migrated online, digital assistants have
become much more vital to full participation in society. The
most effective digital helpers will often need access to personal
information held by incumbent businesses.
The arrival of these two institutional changes after the
most formative years of privacy, along with decades of focus on
anti-intrusion, help explain the field’s weak normative
development of third-party access benefits. To be clear, some
privacy scholars have criticized the field’s excessive emphasis
on anti-intrusion, and its unrealistic expectation that the
individual can take action to redress the harm.260 Some have
also shown how many of the most important data harms are
on the societal level, rather than the individual level.261
However, they have yet to theorize fully the paradox of the
anti-intrusion paradigm obscuring the need to protect what
are essentially (societally beneficial) third-party intrusions on
the business. Indeed, many leading privacy scholars remain
uncomfortable with regulatory monitoring as a solution to
privacy.262 In short, the inattention to developing third-party
access norms has paved the way for privacy pretexts as a
means of walling off data.
To dig a layer deeper into the institutional stratagem,
another way of viewing privacy pretexts is as businesses
258See Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, supra note 148;
FUKUYAMA, RICHMAN, GOEL, KATZ, MELAMED & SCHAAKE, supra note
166, at 28.

259 See, e.g., id. (“[A] middleware system could offer services that many in our
society deem to be urgently needed, such as a robust system of fact-checking and
hate-speech moderation . . . .”).
260 See, e.g., Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 12, at 1419–30 (proposing
a Kafka-based conception of the privacy problem as more about uncontrolled
bureaucratic decisions based on digital files about us without our knowledge).
261 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 5, at 139.
262 See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the
GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1579
(2019) (favoring private monitoring for privacy reasons); but see, e.g., Danielle
Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 24 (2014) (proposing FTC access to credit report
systems).
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leveraging privacy’s anti-access ethos by asserting themselves
as individuals’ privacy guardians against dangerous third
parties. Yet third-party access is only clearly an unwanted
intrusion from the perspective of the incumbent businesses,
whose financial interests are advanced by blocking access to
competitors, digital helpers, and regulators.263 The extent of
individuals’ support for third-party access to their data would
vary by context. In the context of consumer helpers, that
consent is usually implicit to the extent consumers are
choosing to use the third-party tool.264 And the privacy
paradox research suggests that when competitor access would
lower prices, most consumers would be supportive of such
access.265 Support for regulatory access to data would surely
be more varied, but that access results from using authority
granted by elected representatives—thus, at least in theory, it
has the democratically imputed consent of the people.266
Moreover, whereas the role of businesses as privacy guardians
may prove valuable when a government entity, such as the FBI,
is seeking information to prosecute one of the company’s
customers,267 it makes less sense to assert customers’ privacy
when a government entity is seeking information to prosecute
the business.
Privacy pretexts thus operate partly by
reframing access that the business views as an intrusion
instead as an intrusion on the individual’s data.
Ironically, although businesses are using privacy norms in
these instances, they are emphasizing an older conception of
privacy. Theorists who have more recently argued that privacy
is important to protect autonomy, human flourishing, and
liberal citizenship were not stating that anti-intrusion was the
263

See supra Part I.
Of course, these third-party tools raise their own issues of consumer
protection and true consent, although the incumbent presumably collected the
data through a notice and consent regime, and to allow them to do so but not
consumer helpers or challengers would be inconsistent. On the challenges of the
notice and consent regime, see, for example, Solove, supra note 48, at 1880.
265 See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
266 This is clearly a complex issue, and if directly polled consumers would
likely give varying degrees of support depending on whether the data were
anonymized, which agency was collecting the data, and for what purpose.
However, there is no survey consent test for whether each law should be enforced.
For instance, surely it would not be a valid defense to racially disparate predatory
lending investigations that most of the bank’s customers would prefer not to have
their data collected.
267 See, e.g., Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV.
99, 109–10 (2018) (explaining how businesses often protect users’ privacy against
crime and intelligence agencies).
264
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only way to achieve those goals. They recognized that interests
outside of privacy were also important to achieve those goals.
Moreover, many newer conceptions of privacy are consistent
with, if not supportive of, managed third-party access. For
instance, Paul Schwartz argued that we should move beyond
“privacy as information seclusion” and instead approach
“privacy as participation.”268 Schwartz was focused more on
direct, individual participation, but once one recognizes that
full participation in the current digital environment will require
the help of digital intermediaries and other third parties,
businesses’ ability to isolate individuals from the help they
need to manage their data is inconsistent with viewing privacy
as participation.
There is a final irony in incumbent firms using privacy
arguments to block third parties. For years, tech companies
lobbied against privacy regulation by claiming that doing so
would limit users’ access to information.269 Indeed, as the
internet’s awesome potential became apparent in the late
1990s, unfettered data access was arguably the main pitch by
legal scholars, tech companies, and policy makers against
regulating privacy in the information age.270
However,
businesses now use privacy pretexts to justify their own private
ordering that restricts access to information. By blocking
third-party access, businesses are engaging in the very
practice, regulating information flows, that they long said was
anathema.
***
When in tension with privacy, the flow of information was
long thought to be an unstoppable force.271
Instead,
incumbent businesses have exploited the data framework’s
normative and institutional confusion to selectively halt the
flow of information.
When a business seeks to allow
information
to
flow,
it
emphasizes
institutional
trustworthiness and the economic benefits associated with
data management principles. When that same business seeks
to block information in another context, it emphasizes the need
to protect individual autonomy from intrusions by risky third
parties. The implicit message is that the incumbent business
268

Schwartz, Privacy and Participation, supra note 27, at 555.
See Facebook Leaked Documents, supra note 1, at 880–81 (celebrating
successful lobbying based on pro-information flow arguments).
270 See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 5, at 5–8.
271 WESTIN, supra note 6.
269
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should be trusted to sort through these difficult tradeoffs on
the individual’s behalf. With the user retaining control in
theory, businesses thereby seize de facto contextual control of
data.
IV
NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
The above deconstruction identifies a pattern of behavior
in which businesses use anti-intrusion norms to weaken data
management. The problem is not so much the pretexts
themselves but the normative dysfunctions they reveal and the
societal harms they advance. This Part moves from analyzing
the problem to theorizing solutions. The architecture of the
move to repurpose privacy yields insights into a better
regulatory blueprint, one with greater promise to accommodate
the societal stakes in data.
A. Allied Access
The privacy framework needs a stronger third-party access
principle. An emphasis on allied access would aim to preserve
beneficial third-party access to people’s data, especially for
digital assistants, competitors, researchers, and regulators.
Such access would be warranted when individuals or their
democratic representatives choose it.272 In other contexts, a
competition analysis would need to be deployed to identify
allies, but with a more comprehensive sense of the tradeoffs
between access and isolation.273 The case for embracing such
an allied access principle could rest on several rationales.
The most straightforward rationale is viewing allied access
as necessary to address market failures. Economic theory
supports allied access when digital assistants, competitors,
and regulators need access to data to address market failures.
The economic case for intervention becomes stronger where
the market failures also distribute regressively.274 Aside from
the distributive justice concerns, there is reason to believe that
extreme inequality dampens economic growth and necessitates
tax redistribution, which further distorts markets.275 Thus,
272

This covers regulators and digital helpers chosen by consumers.
See infra Section IV.B. (outlining a broader set of interests that should be
mapped in making such decisions); Douglas, supra note 7, at 681 (analyzing how
to weigh privacy in the competition analysis).
274 See supra Section III.B.
275 See STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERVS., HOW INCREASING INCOME
273
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laws preserving allied access have the potential to greatly
improve efficiency and strengthen the economy.276 Also,
economic rationale can justify access mandated to advance
non-economic interests, such as addressing the negative
externalities caused by misinformation. If privacy were to
embrace a more comprehensive economic analysis of data
sharing, it should contribute to a stronger norm of allied
access.
Allied access finds other support in scholars’
conceptualizations of the data economy as creating an
informational public domain.277 A public domain implies rights
of access that benefit society and human flourishing.278 Indeed,
a public domain lens helps to resolve the potential paradox of
privacy law requiring third-party intrusions by regulators,
digital assistants, and competitors.279 If the data belongs to
the public, socially beneficial access is not an intrusion.
Allied access has a more complicated normative
relationship to a strict propertarian regime. If data is property,
individuals should be able to transfer it. Once the transaction
is completed, it is not inevitable from a property framework
that individuals must retain access rights regarding that
transferred property.280 However, property rights operate
within a web of laws restricting what transactions can be
entered into, and under what conditions. Those laws form the
INEQUALITY IS DAMPENING U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND POSSIBLE WAYS TO CHANGE
THE TIDE 3 (2014); cf. Zachary Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap:
When Legal Rule Design Should Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE
L.J. 2478, 2482 (2014) (showing how some laws may distribute more efficiently
than taxes).
276 Cf. supra note 229 (outlining the link between market failures, regulation,
and inequality).
277 See BOYLE, supra note 44, at 183 (arguing for a more expansive conception
of the public domain, with an emphasis on intellectual property, and warning of
various laws that might get in the way); COHEN, supra note 5, at 48 (conceiving
of the data economy as built on raw material extraction and creating a
“biopolitical public domain” that is “foreign to privacy and data protection law”).
278 For an extended discussion on the need to balance access with limitations
on access in light of the “constitutive importance of tinkering for human
flourishing,” see COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF, supra note 23, at
187–220.
279 See supra Part III.B.2. (explaining how access could be seen as an
intrusion).
280 For helpful discussions of using intellectual property rights as a model for
information privacy, see Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1125 (2000); see also Jessica Litman, Information
Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1295–1301 (2000); Michael
C. Pollack, Taking Data, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 77, 106 (2019).
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infrastructure of markets.281 Some of those laws even make
more personal services or body parts inalienable. Many
market laws require administrative agency access, and both
consumer protection and antitrust laws may mandate access
for digital assistants and competitors.282
Moreover, a
fundamental goal of contract and property law is to promote
commercial exchanges.283
Thus, to the extent a propertarian regime is justified
through or respects economic theory, it is at least consistent
with, and perhaps lends normative support to, allied access.
The “right to repair” movement, which seeks to preserve
consumers’ ability to choose third-party repairs rather than
need to go to the original manufacturer, on products ranging
from computers to cars, indicates how property concepts can
translate into a movement in support of access.284
Finally, in some contexts allied access finds normative
support in the proposition that a legal right must have a means
to enforce it. Individuals have long faced difficulties enforcing
privacy laws in court.285
The Supreme Court’s 2021
TransUnion opinion, by forestalling a private right of action for
inaccurate credit reports absent an intrusion, means that
some data management regulations can only be enforced by a
government representative.286 Thus, third-party access by a
regulator is implied by the existence of data management laws
that would not otherwise be enforceable.
Laws promoting allied access would come with the risk
that institutions may abuse them. Digital assistants and
incumbent businesses might exploit the principle to acquire
excess data, in the extreme enabling them to gain monopoly
power or erode privacy. Business regulators might share
281 See Hanoch Dagan et. al., The Law of the Market, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
2020, at ii (“[M]arkets necessarily depend on well-designed and well-enforced
rules of the game: they rely on, and are constituted by, a legal infrastructure.”).
282 See Van Loo, Regulatory Monitors, supra note 182, at 384–89; supra Parts
I & III.B.3. (explaining how various laws, including Dodd-Frank Act’s consumer
protection rules, mandate access).
283 See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS, MAKING AND DOING DEALS 6 (5th ed. 2018).
284 See, e.g., Nicholas A. Mirr, Defending the Right to Repair: An Argument for
Federal Legislation Guaranteeing the Right to Repair, 105 IOWA L. REV. 2393, 2411
(2020) (referring to the property components).
285 Cf. Citron & Solove, supra note 110, at 1 (“Countless privacy violations are
not remedied or addressed on the grounds that there has been no cognizable
harm.”).
286 See supra Part I.
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information collected with other agencies, like the FBI, and use
it against individuals.
Overall, allied access thus risks
becoming a tool for undoing some of the privacy movement’s
important progress.
Steps would need to be taken to mitigate these adverse
outcomes, including appropriate legal rules overseeing digital
helpers and requirements of anonymization.287 However,
several factors limit these risks. With respect to digital
assistants and competitors, allied access would mean sharing
information that a business already has with another business
that the individual has chosen. The total information shared
thus does not increase and stays within the universe that the
individual has elected to trust. Additionally, it would be
inconsistent to allow the individual to choose to share the
information with the incumbent firm but not with other firms,
especially while allowing the incumbent to share that same
information.
The concern about inter-agency regulatory data sharing is
understandable, as regulators do sometimes transfer
information to other agencies.288 However, regulators do not
have the expertise, resources, and self-interest to monitor for
personal violations.289
The Privacy Act also restricts
information-sharing among agencies.290 More importantly,
agencies like the FBI can already readily obtain individuals’
data held by companies without a warrant, through the Fourth
Amendment’s third-party doctrine.291 They do not need a
regulatory back door for obtaining private sector data because
287 See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, How Digitial Assistants can
Harm our Economy, Privacy, and Democracy, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1287
(2017) (emphasizing competition problems, such as collusion); Van Loo, Digital
Market Perfection, supra note 7, at 823 (discussing broader regulatory oversight
of digital intermediaries); Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to
Big Data, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 339, 360 (2017) (observing the use of anonymization to
overcome privacy concerns in the collection of big data). Another tool is to use
data silos, particularly for regulators. See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, “Slack” in
the Data Age, 73 ALA. L. REV. 47, 96 (2021).
288 See, e.g., Hyman, supra note 190, at 1140–41 (discussing information
sharing).
289 Also, the access gained by regulators would be oriented toward
investigating businesses, and would thus collect either anonymized data or large
data sets.
290 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2012) (prohibiting sharing except in enumerated
circumstances).
291 See, e.g., Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (holding that
Fourth Amendment protections extend to cellphone location data collected by
wireless carriers, but reaffirming third-party doctrine in other circumstances).
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they have a front door.
It bears emphasis that an allied access principle is both
positive and normative. It describes features of existing
information privacy legislation, such as HIPAA’s allowance of
patient data collection for third-party research or the DoddFrank Act’s mandate that the CFPB consider open banking
rules.292 More subtly, regulators such as the FTC and CFPB
are deputizing large firms as privacy enforcers over smaller
businesses.293 For instance, by settlement order Facebook
must check app developers’ privacy practices.294 In other
words, enforcement currently requires large firms to intrude
on smaller ones.295 Finally, allied access captures a broader
theme of third-party in many scholarly proposals for improving
governance of the data economy.296
Although these developments have begun to elevate
beneficial third-party access, they are normatively siloed and
existing legal rules lack a comprehensive consideration of data
management interests.
Particularly in light of privacy’s
normative asymmetries working against data management, a
broad-reaching allied access principle could provide valuable
foundations for efforts underway to improve the data
regulatory framework.

292 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (2020) (providing an exception for third-party
access, most notably for research purposes designed to improve health care);
supra Part II.
293 See Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms as Public Enforcers,
106 VA. L. REV. 467, 496–97 (2020).
294 See Facebook, Inc., FTC File No. 0923184, No. C-4365, at 3–4 (F.T.C. July
27, 2012) (decision and order).
295 See Van Loo, supra note 293, at 499.
296 These proposals range from interoperability to regulatory monitoring. See,
e.g., Fukuyama, Richman, Goel, Katz, Melamed & Schaake, supra note 166, at
35 (proposing third-party algorithmic access to combat misinformation in social
media); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 262, at 24 (proposing FTC access to credit
report systems); Yafit Lev-Aretz, Data Philanthropy, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1491 (2019)
(“The data philanthropy exception reinforces the values at the heart of the FIPs,
provides guidance in a field that currently operates in a legal vacuum, and
introduces the possibility of responsible sharing by and to smaller market
participants.”); Mary D. Fan, The Right to Benefit from Big Data as a Public
Resource, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1438, 1438 (2021) (proposing “a model that permits
controlled access and the use of big data for public interest purposes”); Mark A.
Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86
CALIF. L. REV. 479, 604 (1998) (proposing interoperability as a response to
network effects); Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision
of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311 (2015) (explaining how digital intermediaries
are important even in retail goods markets); Packin, supra note 149 (discussing
access rules).
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B. Mapping Data Management
Another implication of privacy pretexts is that the law
would benefit from a more nuanced and comprehensive
mapping of individuals’ data management interests and how
they relate to anti-intrusion interests. Privacy pretexts thus
provide support for privacy scholars’ calls for considering a
broad set of interests to safeguard,297 as well as antitrust
scholars’ calls for paying greater attention to privacy in
competition analyses.298 Yet by deprioritizing economics and
access, the privacy lens has made it overall less likely that
anti-intrusion and data management interests are rigorously
balanced against one another, particularly in allied access
contexts.299
The typical privacy contexts analyzed are those that are
most problematic from an anti-intrusion perspective: the
individual’s sharing of data directly with a business, such as a
bank or hospital, or that same business then choosing to
transfer data for its own gain.300 That focus means less
attention to contexts in which transfers to third parties might
bring data management benefits, such as when the individual
would want to transfer the information to third parties.301
Again, the contextual focus matters partly because of the
flipped hierarchy of economic interests. In the contexts that
have traditionally been the focus of privacy—such as the
consumer sharing information with a business—economic
arguments most directly weigh against privacy regulation
because it would impose costs. Mapping the interests specific
to allied access contexts would mean the opposite. In allied
access contexts, economic considerations support regulation
by advancing competition and informed and rational
consumers.302 A clearer and more comprehensive mapping of
data management interests would make it harder for
297

See supra Part I.
For examples of scholars calling for greater attention to the interface
between privacy and competition, see Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and
Power, 20 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2013); Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust
Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist’s Journey Towards Pervasive Surveillance in
Spite of Consumers’ Preference for Privacy, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 39, 88 (2019).
299 See supra Section III.B.
300 These include the economic benefits to the individual of sharing the
information, such as a free digital service or greater choice, as well as the lower
regulatory costs imposed on the firm.
301 See supra Section III.B.1.
302 See supra Section III.B.2.
298
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businesses to shift the policy focus to the normative hierarchy
they prefer.
Another way to think about privacy pretexts is as
incumbents narrowing the contextual focus.
The main
narrowing has been the focus of much of this paper—
businesses urging others to look at only anti-intrusion
interests rather than both anti-intrusion and data
management interests. A second type of analytic narrowing
comes once the policy lens succeeds in considering data
management. If that occurs, incumbents would still prefer to
narrow the data management inquiry by excluding economic
interests, instead focusing on a subset of data management
interests, such as accuracy of the data—which would be more
likely to mandate an individual right to access rather than
third—party access. Any inclusion of data management
economic interests might make it harder for incumbents to
wall off their data, subject to a competition analysis.
Finally, if the data analysis arrives at economic
considerations, the ideal for incumbents is still that the
analysis remains in a narrower economic frame, such as solely
within an antitrust balancing test. Limiting the analysis to
antitrust increases the chances that other economic benefits
to data sharing are omitted, such as the more consumer
law-related interest in helping consumers to make informed
choices—which is benefitted by independent digital helpers
having access to data.303 Thus, to the extent that the policy
analysis remains confined to either anti-intrusion,
anti-economics, or a narrow competition analysis, it operates
in service of incumbents’ data control.
One shift that would help to broaden the analytic lens
would be to establish a stronger identity for data management.
One of the main goals would be to strengthen the norms
surrounding data management, to make it harder to brush
data management aside by emphasizing anti-intrusion. This
shift could happen whether data management is viewed as part
of privacy or independent of it.
A comprehensive mapping of interests need not pit
303 This statement may strike many non-economist lawyers as confusing,
because antitrust law is so strongly linked to the concept of competition, but as
a matter of economics, many other areas of the law also advance competition. For
example, consumer laws advance competition by promoting choice. See, e.g.,
Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, supra note 6, at 830–33 (explaining how digital
intermediaries can promote “perfect competition” in the broader economic use of
the phrase).
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anti-intrusion against data management, even in allied access
contexts. Granted, a more comprehensive consideration of
tradeoffs would sometimes highlight tensions in the bundle of
anti-intrusion and data management principles. However,
giving greater weight to data management does not mean that
anti-intrusion becomes commensurately less important.
Consumers would still want assurances that their digital
assistants are safeguarding their data and not selling it to data
brokers, for instance. Indeed, the balance of interests in allied
access contexts may sometimes weigh against sharing certain
sensitive information.
At a minimum, comprehensiveness seeks to ensure that
the policy outcome does not rest solely on interest hierarchies
manipulated by businesses. Incumbents would have a harder
time simultaneously arguing for prioritizing consumers’
economic interests to fight anti-intrusion regulation while
arguing against prioritizing consumers’ economic interests to
fight data management regulation. A clearer contextual map
of interests could also help judges and regulators in
undertaking the law’s many formal balancing tests, in areas
ranging from consumer protection to antitrust, to determine
whether business conduct is appropriate.304
Finally, many potential regulatory tools, like data
portability, would find support through arguments based in
both economics and other norms, such as autonomy.305 As a
result, the expanded mapping of data-related interests may
provide the normative force, and a political coalition, necessary
to finally bring the kind of omnibus privacy legislation that the
field has long proposed.
C. Anti-Pretext Rules
In addition to the more conceptual policy implications
outlined so far, privacy pretexts can inform more concrete legal
reforms. This section first considers policy responses that
would punish or discourage firms from using pretexts. It then
moves on to a more promising set of reforms focusing on
developing laws that instead target the data management
harms that firms advance under the cover of privacy.

304 For a discussion of how privacy is typically ignored in the antitrust
balancing test, see Douglas, supra note 6, at 654.
305 Autonomy is preserved because businesses can still continue to offer the
same products and services to the marketplace.
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1. Regulating Pretexts
Should the law police privacy pretexts? Possible paths
include new or existing rules related to disclosures, standards
of proof, and estoppel. Although offering some promise in
theory, each of these approaches has significant practical
limits in addressing the big-picture problem.
(1) Disclosures. If companies prominently declare to
regulators, businesses, or consumers that they are taking a
step to safeguard privacy, they could be required to
prominently disclose ulterior data management motives. To
illustrate, consider again the email by Bank of America
warning its customers of the risks of using third-party services,
and encouraging customers to instead use the bank’s Security
Center.306 That email only mentioned the benefits to the
customer of using the Bank of America portal for all third
parties.307 A fuller set of disclosures by Bank of America would
acknowledge that using their Security Center would give Bank
of America control over whether the third-party app retains
access, as well as what information the app can see. The bank
could also be required to disclose that it has financial
incentives to limit the data available to third-party apps, and
that those incentives have the potential to influence the
information that Bank of America allows third parties to
access. Essentially, the disclosures would give consumers
information that would better situate them to decide whether
to follow Bank of America’s advice to use its Security Center or
to instead allow the third-party fintechs direct access to their
bank accounts.
Firms could also be required to divulge any acts that are
inconsistent with the privacy values they assert. For instance,
in announcing new third-party restrictions, Facebook might be
required to disclose that it still shares the data with favored
third parties. Or a business that is citing privacy to avoid
sharing data with a regulator could be forced to divulge that it
sells that same requested regulatory data to third parties.
For representations to individuals, existing consumer laws
offer a potential response. The prohibition of unfair and
deceptive acts is the core of U.S. privacy law and provides a
remedy when a business makes deceptive privacy claims.308 A
306
307
308

See supra Part II.
See id.
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 43, at 599.
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company telling consumers one thing, as in the Bank of
America email, without disclosing as prominently the potential
harm, is arguably a deceptive act.309
Although disclosures are worth considering, whether they
can have much of an impact on this issue is debatable. After
all, disclosures have a mixed track record for effectiveness.310
Moreover, concepts of privacy are excessively complex, causing
many scholars exasperation. Consumers will inevitably face
difficulty, if not impossibility, in assessing companies’
competing privacy claims.311
One potential advantageous factor for disclosures in the
context of privacy pretexts is that some of the main critiques
of disclosures are in contexts in which absence of information
is the problem.312 With privacy pretexts, the problem is
one-sided information, and it is at least unclear why adding a
more balanced communication should overall worsen the
informational context for consumers.
(2) Standards of Proof. The law might impose a higher
burden of proof on any firm asserting a privacy argument for
withholding information from competitors, digital helpers, or
regulators. Under a higher standard of proof, the firm might,
for instance be required to establish that the risk of intrusion
is substantial and likely. Also, the firm would need to show
that the risk cannot be mitigated satisfactorily while handing
over the requested information, such as by anonymization.
Inconsistent behavior could also make the privacy claims
inherently suspect. Inconsistencies include self-dealing, such
as Google citing privacy for not sharing ad click information
but then allowing advertisers to purchase that access.313
Inconsistent privacy conduct would weigh against allowing a
privacy defense in court.
(3) Estoppel. Estoppel serves to prevent an entity from
taking actions inconsistent with prior behavior. In the context
of a firm seeking to withhold information, estoppel might be
applied prospectively or retrospectively. Prospectively, the firm
309 However, the doctrinal path to making that case would likely run into
challenges, such as the issue of harm and consumer law’s tolerance of omissions
rather than misstatements. Cf. Citron & Solove, supra note 110, at 11 (outlining
challenges to establishing the concreteness of many privacy harms).
310 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 647, 649–51 (2011).
311 See id. at 649.
312 See id. at 647, 649–51.
313 See supra Part I.
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might be forbidden from asserting a privacy defense to block
information transfer if it has recently taken inconsistent
actions, such as sharing the information in question with third
parties. Or once a firm has argued privacy as a reason for
failing to share information with digital assistants or
regulators, it could be prohibited from later sharing that
category of information for its own profits. Taken further, this
could mean imposing an information fiduciary duty on the firm
once it has represented itself as proactively taking steps to
protect consumers’ privacy from third parties.314
Retrospectively, if the firm already shared the requested
data with third parties, it would not be allowed to argue in the
present instance that it cannot share the information.
Inconsistent later sharing of the data might then be subject to
disgorgement of profits gained.315
Although estoppel would provide a remedy in limited
contexts, it is not without drawbacks, such as uncertainty and
the potential to discourage privacy innovations within the firm.
Another concern is that since firms are often consumers’
privacy advocates vis-à-vis the government, the law should be
careful not to discourage firms from asserting legitimate
privacy interests.
The Limits of Regulating Pretexts. Beyond the localized
challenges discussed within the categories above, these legal
reforms share more general limits. They would be difficult to
enforce, in some cases requiring monitoring or investigations
to know when businesses are deploying pretexts. They would
add litigation complexity and encourage legal wrangling, which
could benefit wealthy firms at the expense of other parties.
Also, as illustrated by their application in the context of
contracts, disclosure and estoppel are each perhaps too
open-ended and dependent on judgment to be administrable,
especially at scale.316 Thus, even with adequate design, it is
314 On fiduciary duties and duties of loyalty, see Jack M. Balkin, Information
Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. D. L. REV. 1183, 1186 (2016); Neil
M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, 99 WASH. U.
L. REV. 961, 966 (2021).
315 Some of these applications may require, or at least benefit from,
legislation. However, as an equitable remedy, estoppel’s reach is potentially broad
and well-suited to privacy. Cf. Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE L.J.
1050, 1143–44 (2021) (concluding that equity “solves problems of high
complexity and uncertainty that law . . . cannot easily handle” including
“polycentricity, conflicting rights, and opportunism.”).
316 See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 61, 72, 88 (1974)
(characterizing estoppel as the conclusion that, for reasons the court does not
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debatable whether direct regulation of pretexts is worth the
resources, especially compared to other approaches discussed
below. At best, it would be only a small part of the policy
response to privacy pretexts.
2. Elevating Data Management
Instead of regulating pretexts, the law could target the
heart of the harm by promoting data management. At a
minimum, legislatures and regulators would ideally amend
existing misappropriated laws to clarify their limits. As one
example of reform that is long overdue, the CFAA should be
amended to clarify that the statute cannot be used to block the
collection of publicly available information, or to prevent
consumer-approved access to consumers’ own accounts.317
More broadly, since the main goal of privacy pretexts is
throttling information transfers to undermine data
management, one way to directly address privacy pretexts’
harm would be to enact legal rules that explicitly identify
allowable information flows, such as originally envisioned
through HIPAA. An update to the Administrative Procedure
Act and agency-specific information collection statutes could
more generally clarify when regulators may collect information
despite its link to personal data.318 Such laws would ideally
also emphasize processes for minimizing intrusion risks, such
effective anonymization.319
An array of other new data management rules could be
imagined.
The CFPB could write rules promoting open
banking, obligating incumbent financial institutions to share
customer-requested data with third parties.320
Stronger
interoperability requirements would make it harder for
wish to elaborate, judgment must be had for the plaintiff).
317 Orin Kerr has argued against overly broad applications of the CFAA for
almost two decades. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access”
and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 NYU L. REV. 1596, 1599
(2003).
318 Any such update should also include a broader set of privacy safeguards.
See Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State, supra note 9, at 1625–27.
319 Anonymization has limits, but those limits have been exaggerated because
of some anecdotal early failed efforts that had employed flawed designs. See, e.g.,
Ira S. Rubinstein & Woodrow Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk, 91 WASH. L. REV.
703, 708–09 (2016) (outlining the importance of anonymization).
320 See Van Loo, Making Innovation More Competitive, supra note 6, at 267
(critiquing the CFPB for not writing open banking rules and pointing out that
such rules are necessary for competition). For a more comprehensive proposal
for open banking, see Cesare Fracassi & William Magnuson, Data Autonomy, 74
VAND. L. REV. 327, 328, 383 (2021).
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companies to monopolize data or platform access.
For
example, the bipartisan “Augmenting Compatibility and
Competition by Enabling Service Switching Act” would make
large platforms allow users to download and transfer their
data.321 A more ambitious move would be to require platforms
to allow users to choose the third parties whose algorithms
would manage their social media accounts.322
Related
legislation has been proposed that would allow price
comparison apps to thrive as well.323
Laws promoting data management would, of course, have
economic and other justifications beyond solely addressing
privacy pretexts.324 But if information sharing is mandated by
law, businesses would have diminished—if not eliminated—
motives for crafting privacy pretexts because doing so would
not insulate them from allied access.
D. Policy Making with Privacy Pretexts in Mind
Policy makers should consider privacy pretexts when
enforcing or creating legal rules. That means clearly thinking
through potential rhetorical guises and delineating acceptable
uses of the legal rules. Minding privacy pretexts is important
because each new enforcement action or written rule increases
the risks of extending more pretext-driven control to
companies over contextual information norms. For instance,
the most prominent and far-reaching U.S. privacy enforcement
action, the FTC’s Cambridge Analytica settlement order with
Facebook, required the social network to monitor third parties’
privacy compliance.325 That requirement gave the social
network an authoritative source—a binding court order—that
the company later used to justify blocking academic
researchers and gathering more data from competitors that
use its platform.326
The FTC order was focused on
321 Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching
Act of 2019, S. 2658, 116th Cong. §§ 2(7)(b), 3(a) (2019).
322 The Act has elements of this, but this concept is more fully reflected in a
recent scholarly proposal. See id. (providing a mechanism for users to enlist
third-party data custodians that could manage access to multiple social
networks); FUKUYAMA, RICHMAN, GOEL, KATZ, MELAMED & SCHAAKE, supra note
166, at 32 (proposing “middleware algorithms” to allow users greater control over
their data and access to online information).
323 S. 2658, 116th Cong. § 5 (2019).
324 See supra Parts I & III.B.
325 See Google, Inc., FTC File No. 102-3136, §§ 2, 3 (Mar. 30, 2011) (consent
order).
326 See Horwitz, supra note 206.
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anti-intrusion and demonstrated limited awareness of data
management.327
Data management considerations are especially important
to keep in mind in any anti-intrusion legislation or rulemaking.
Historically, as discussed above, the opposite occurred—
addressing
anti-intrusion
when
legislating
data
management.328 When data management concerns motivated
legislation, as with HIPAA, lawmakers felt compelled to add on
anti-intrusion rules. However, when the main impulse was
anti-intrusion, as with the CFAA, lawmakers were more likely
to ignore data management.329 Greater attention symmetry to
these two sides of information flow is warranted.
As part of this balance, a privacy law regime must have a
sense of market failures. Taken too far, privacy policies
emphasizing non-economic rights and control risk providing a
pyrrhic victory. Consumer advocates would feel like they have
won because of data security standards and strict prohibitions
against unauthorized sharing of data with third parties.
Dominant businesses could also feel like they have won. They
need to invest in data security anyways, so that is not
necessarily a concession.330 And incumbent businesses would
have gained a powerful anti-intrusion norm for cementing their
market positions. Thus, any comprehensive privacy legislation
must also target any potential accompanying market failures.
Doing so could lessen or eliminate privacy pretexts resulting
from the new rules.
Another way of viewing this state of affairs is that the
absence of comprehensive privacy legislation facilitates privacy
pretexts. The more contexts that are clearly covered by strong
data management and anti-intrusion rules, the less leeway
companies have to misdirect the normative conversations.331
327 In terms of third-party access, the settlement relied on Facebook hiring a
third-party auditor. That meant the auditor would be friendly to Facebook, who
was then a client to the auditor. And the auditor did not even have access, as it
instead relied on representations by Facebook to ensure compliance. See Megan
Gray, Understanding and Improving Privacy Audits Under FTC Orders 4, 6 (Apr.
2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3165143
[https://perma.cc/QNX4-CXDR].
328 See supra Part I.
329 See id.
330 Security is important for customer relations, and it is difficult to regulate
the level of security taken. Thus, investing in security is not a huge concession.
331 Indeed, the same can be said for vague anti-intrusion statutes, which
businesses have used to undermine anti-intrusion protections. See Waldman,
supra note 5, at 797–98.
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Such comprehensive legislation also can limit industry capture
of the regulatory process, albeit imperfectly.332 If laws state
clearly that regulators can collect certain categories of
information, for instance, the captured regulator has less of an
opening to use privacy as a pretext for not collecting that
information.
Again, greater attention to data management does not
mean weak anti-intrusion rules. Viewed through an extreme
anti-intrusion lens, these two faces of privacy are
incompatible. For instance, a universal anti-intrusion regime
would prohibit all allied access. However, that extreme does
not reflect the field of privacy. Striking the balance between
these two sets of data interests will no doubt at times require
difficult tradeoffs.333 The involvement of an appropriately
resourced and authorized regulator would help in managing
these points of tension. That regulator could help adjust the
laws as businesses inevitably attempt to strategically
maneuver around them.
On the matter of tensions between data management and
anti-intrusion, it helps to consider the policy baseline. The
U.S. privacy framework is overall quite limited. As a practical
matter, a comprehensive mapping of privacy interests could
provide a blueprint for legislation with significantly stronger
anti-intrusion and data management laws, as other countries
have adopted.334 At a minimum, reflecting on how businesses
might seek to block beneficial information flows would lessen
the chances that the privacy movement’s success causes
unintended harms.
So far, this discussion has focused on making privacy law.
But there is a broader context that helps to underscore why
privacy pretexts merit attention in policy making. Over the
past several centuries, private sector mobilization of the law
has repeatedly facilitated large-scale economic transitions.
Property laws played a key role in allowing the enclosure of the
British commons.335 Labor laws paved the path for the Second
332 For a helpful background review of the relevant literature, see Wiener &
Richman, supra note 44.
333 Indeed, at least some of the criticism about the GDPR reflects the tension
between its data management and anti-intrusion sides.
334 Statutes are possible that have strong rules guarding both sets of
interests, as demonstrated by the GDPR. The GDPR limits what businesses can
do with data, especially without being candid, but still gives consumers strong
portability and access. See GDPR, art. 15, 20, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 38 (EU).
335 See Dan Bogart & Gary Richardson, Property Rights and Parliament in
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Industrial Revolution.336
Scholars have shown how firms have more recently used
legal entrepreneurship to set the stage for the rise of the
information economy. Intellectual property laws allowed a
kind of “second enclosure” of the intellectual commons.337 And
platforms like Uber have exploited loopholes in the law and
then mobilized their constituents to lobby for favorable legal
changes.338
Privacy pretexts provide another example of such legal
mobilization, whether as part of that second enclosure, or as a
new third enclosure movement.339
They allow firms to
entrench their market positions by enclosing their data from
third parties. The ability to block disruptive apps like Power
Ventures, the social media tool, enabled stronger walls around
incumbents like Facebook.340
Privacy pretexts also fit into the second act of each of these
economic revolutions—the legal countermovement.
The
enclosure of the commons and the industrial revolution caused
such significant upheaval that diverse actors responded with
protective measures.
Muckraking journalists exposed
slaughterhouse filth and anticompetitive monopolies.341
Grassroots organizations launched educational campaigns
about toxic waste dumps.342
And Congress massively
Industrializing Britain, 54 J. L. & ECON. 241, 247–48 (2011).
336 As did the capital formation framework. See HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR
AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL 125, 251–69 (1974).
337 See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of
the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37 (2003).
338 See Pollman & Barry, supra note 44, at 446.
339 On the one hand, whereas the second enclosure was more contentfocused, the third enclosure may be more data-focused, as several recent
scholarly observations can be classified. See COHEN, supra note 5, at 68–79
(showing how platforms have repurposed laws to control data); cf. Mark A.
Lemley, The Splinternet, 70 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1399 (2021) (observing a broader
return to walled gardens, due largely to nations erecting barriers). On the other
hand, James Boyle foreshadowed many of these tools of information exclusion in
observing the second enclosure movement in the 1990s and 2000s. See BOYLE,
supra note 44, at 182 (observing that “the idea that personhood entails control
over information . . . might seem” to pose “a challenge to the distribution of power
in society”).
340 See supra Section II.A.
341 See generally IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY
(1904); UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906). On countermovements more broadly,
see, for example., COHEN, supra note 5, at 5–8.
342 Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities,
Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental
Justice Movement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 775, 813 (1998).

VAN LOO PE1 TECH EDIT

2022]

9/10/20222:08 PM

PRIVACY PRETEXTS

167

expanded legal protections.343 The beginnings of related
responses to information economy discontents can now be
seen.
In that historical context, privacy pretexts can be viewed
as an overlooked tool for mobilizing norms to undermine the
accountability countermovement. Allied access is key to
accountability, particularly regulators and digital tools.
Furthermore, to have enough incentive to mobilize politically,
harmed individuals must have some way of knowing they are
being harmed. Yet businesses have also used privacy pretexts
to block journalists, academics, and nonprofits seeking access
for the purpose of assessing what businesses are doing with
information.344 Information accountability must be dispersed
and polycentric, but privacy pretexts undermine the
accountability of diverse actors.345
These specific tactics are important, but they are only the
most visible part of how privacy pretexts ward off a
countermovement. Privacy pretexts are concerning not only
for what conduct they may allow now or in the future. They
are also noteworthy because they are laying linguistic and
normative foundations before any real legal countermovement
has formed. Anti-intrusion and data management will lie at
the core of any substantial renovations to the legal
architecture. Privacy ploys may thus shape the coming
construction of a legal framework for responding to data
economy discontents.
It is also worth noting that one feature separates privacy
pretexts from some of the other instances of businesses
mobilizing laws in societally harmful ways. In the case of free
speech, intellectual property, and transparency laws, the main
move is for businesses to assert their own entitlements under
those laws.346 With privacy pretexts, businesses are instead
343 See, e.g., Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Agric. on the So-called
“Beveridge Amendment” to the Agricultural Appropriation Bill, 59th Cong. 102
(1906) (statement of Charles P. Neill).
344 See supra Part II.A.2.
345 On the importance of pluralistic accountability, see, e.g., Carla L. Reyes &
Jeff Ward, Digging into Algorithms: Legal Ethics and Legal Access, 21 NEV. L.J.
325, 325 (2020) (arguing that lawyers and non-technologists alike must
collectively “focus on understanding algorithmic systems as technology created,
manipulated, and used in a particular context”).
346 See BOYLE, supra note 44, at 13; Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement,
supra note 337, at 33; COHEN, supra note 5, at 5–8, 257; On how businesses have
become the primary beneficiaries of FOIA, see Margaret B. Kwoka, Inside FOIA,
Inc., 126 YALE L.J. FORUM 265, 266 (2016).
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asserting themselves as protectors of individuals’ privacy. In
other words, whereas transparency and speech assert the legal
rights of a small number of business owners, privacy pretexts
are more dangerously cloaked as advancing the rights of the
masses. That difference gives privacy pretexts the potential to
have greater normative reach and staying power.
For these reasons, the project of elevating privacy pretexts
in the minds of lawmakers, judges, and regulators has a
potentially important legal role to play. Although they are
presumably uncoordinated instances of actors aggressively
pursuing their self-interests, privacy pretexts nonetheless may
exert a powerful collective influence.
Seemingly subtle
decisions about whether to include data management within
privacy, whether to embrace economic rationales, and whether
to emphasize allied access can rearrange policy makers’ design
decisions. Exposing the systemic anti-intrusion opportunism
lessens the chance that businesses reorient privacy in
opposition to data optimality.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown how businesses repurpose privacy
to shape the contextual norms that govern information flows.
They use that control to erect walls around their data, thereby
excluding key actors, such as competitors, digital helpers,
researchers, and regulators. Understanding the architecture
of those digital fortresses reveals deeper challenges to the
information society.
Privacy pretexts operate by reframing societally beneficial
data sharing as an intrusion on the individual. The privacy
framework’s skepticism of third-party access facilitates that
equivocation. So does the lack of attention to economic
arguments. Those two factors, along with the field’s expansive
definition, have left the norms for data management less
developed, and thus more vulnerable to obfuscation. The
enormous task of designing data regulation would be
challenging enough with linguistic and conceptual clarity.
Businesses’ rhetorical distortions warp the normative and legal
framework upon which reforms will build.
Data management principles are too societally important
to be systematically sidelined by privacy’s pathologies.
Fortunately, these two faces of data interests need not persist
in an irreconcilable state of tension. No universal principle
requires the law to allow incumbent businesses to strategically
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choose between the free flow of information and enclosure.
Attentiveness to privacy pretexts in rhetoric, rulemaking,
and enforcement is the first step. Caution about pretexts need
not halt privacy’s progress, but should instead inform its
shape. A greater emphasis on the economic arguments in
favor of data management’s collective goals would offer a more
promising path forward for governing data in the twenty-first
century.
Whatever the normative foundation, network
technologies’ core societal contribution is to bring people
together. A strong principle of allied access would make it
harder for these technologies to be used as tools of isolation.

